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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 9, 1993, Bernice Loftin, a 68 year-old woman and 
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Medicare beneficiary, underwent hip replacement surgery.  One week 
after her surgery, Ms. Loftin dislocated her surgically repaired hip.  X-
rays subsequently revealed that the hip prosthesis was displaced and 
pressing against her sciatic nerve.  On June 19, 1993, Ms. Loftin 
underwent a second surgery, which led to a serious infection.  Her 
doctors fought the infection with extensive medical procedures including 
radical debridement, the insertion of cement antibiotic beads, and 
prolonged physical therapy.  At the time of these surgeries, Medicare 
was Ms. Loftin’s primary medical insurer, and it paid $143,881.82 for 
Ms. Loftin’s surgeries and subsequent medical care.1 
Ms. Loftin, represented by Stephen Goetzmann, a personal injury 
lawyer, filed suit against the manufacturer of the hip prosthesis alleging 
defective design of the hip prosthesis.2  Before trial Ms. Loftin settled 
with the manufacturer, although it never admitted liability.  The 
manufacturer paid the full settlement amount of $256,000 to Mr. 
Goetzmann, who, after deducting his 40% contingency fee, distributed 
the balance of $153,600 to Ms. Loftin.  The manufacturer paid all of the 
settlement; no part came from its liability insurance.3 
In October 2000, after Ms. Loftin received her settlement, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”)4 filed suit against 
Ms. Loftin; her attorney, Mr. Goetzmann; and the manufacturer under 
the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (“MSP”).5  Under the MSP the 
 1. Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 493-94 (5th Cir. 2003); Thompson v. 
Goetzmann, No. 3:00-CV-2174-M, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9258, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. July 3, 2001); 
Complaint at ¶¶ 17, 28, Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2003) (No. 3:00-CV-2174-
M). 
 2. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 493.  The Fifth Circuit stated that “Loftin’s claims [in the 
complaint] included the medical expenses paid for by Medicare.”  Id.  This characterization does not 
paint an accurate picture.  Texas pleading rules allow plaintiffs to sue for the amount billed by the 
hospital rather than the amount paid by the plaintiff.  It is common for defendants to chip away at 
the amount claimed by arguing that the plaintiff did not pay the amount billed by the health care 
provider.  Mr. Goetzmann, representing Ms. Loftin, never believed that he was bringing a claim or 
settling a claim on behalf of Medicare.  Telephone Interview with Stephen R. Goetzmann (Mar. 12, 
2007). 
 3. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 493-94. 
 4. Medicare is presently administered by an agency known as Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”).  Prior to being administered by the CMS, Medicare was administered 
by the Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”).  Both agencies were organized under the 
authority of the United States Department of Health and Human Services.  Throughout this paper, I 
will refer to the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services as the decision maker 
on behalf of Medicare. 
 5. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 493; Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 4-6, 11. 
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Secretary is allowed to seek reimbursement from a primary insurer6 for 
payments made by Medicare to a Medicare beneficiary that the primary 
insurer should have paid or from any person that receives a payment 
from a primary insurer.7  The Secretary argued that by making its own 
payment to Ms. Loftin, the manufacturer was self-insuring against any 
risk and was thus a primary insurer subject to the MSP statute.8  Further, 
as allowed under the statute, the Secretary sought reimbursement from 
Ms. Loftin and Mr. Goetzmann out of the payments received from the 
manufacturer and, under a provision that allows the Secretary to seek 
double damages from a primary insurer,9 the Secretary sought double 
damages from the manufacturer.10  Had the Secretary won this lawsuit, 
Medicare could have taken almost all of Ms. Loftin’s payment, leaving 
her less than $10,000 to compensate her for her pain and suffering.  
Alternatively, Medicare could have claimed double damages from the 
manufacturer, thus increasing the manufacturer’s total payment to 
$543,763.6411 even though it never admitted liability for Ms. Loftin’s 
injury.  Under these circumstances, Ms. Loftin and the manufacturer had 
no incentive to settle their dispute.  And, had Mr. Goetzmann known of 
this liability before bringing the claim on behalf of Ms. Loftin, he likely 
would not have agreed to the representation, because his best chance of 
recovering a fee would have been a long and costly trial. 
The Northern District of Texas,12 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,13 and almost every court in every 
jurisdiction to consider the Secretary’s unprecedented argument rejected 
 6. A primary insurer is one “who is contractually committed to settling a claim up to the 
applicable policy limit before any other insurer becomes liable for any part of the same claim” 
whereas a secondary or excess insurer “is liable for settling any part of a claim not covered by an 
insured’s primary insurer.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 823 (8th ed. 2004); see also Douglas L. 
Grundmeyer, Insurance, 64 LOY. L. REV. 31, 94 (2000) (“‘Primary’ insurance coverage attaches 
immediately upon the occurrence that gives rise to liability, whereas an ‘excess’ policy covers 
liability above the limits of the exhausted primary insurance.”). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2002) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) 
(2006)). 
 8. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 493; Goetzmann, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9258 at *4-5; 
Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 45. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2002) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) 
(2006)) (allowing the Secretary to seek “double damages against [a primary plan]” which the 
government has to sue to recover its conditional outlays on behalf of a Medicare beneficiary). 
 10. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 493-94; Complaint, supra note 1, at ¶ 57. 
 11. This amount is equal to the total payment to Ms. Loftin plus double the amount of 
Medicare’s conditional payments. 
 12. Goetzmann, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9258, at *5-9. 
 13. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 500-01. 
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it.14  And these courts did so with good reason: the Secretary’s position 
had no basis in the text of the statute or the legislative history15 and, as is 
clear from Ms. Loftin’s case, the Secretary’s position makes it difficult 
to settle tort lawsuits. 
Nonetheless, in 2003, as a small part of the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 (“MMA”), Congress amended the MSP to 
reflect the Secretary’s litigation position.16  The MMA is best known for 
adding a prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries.  The new 
drug benefit captured the national spotlight and occupied the bulk of 
Congressional debate over the MMA.  Congress spent little, if any, time 
discussing the amendments to the MSP or the implications of the 
amendment. 
Yet, this amendment significantly affects the ability of Medicare 
beneficiaries to bring or settle individual tort claims, the incentives for 
attorneys to represent Medicare beneficiaries in individual and mass tort 
litigation,17 and the tort system generally.  Because of this – and despite 
 14. See Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co., 346 F.3d 36, 43 (2nd Cir. 2003); In re Orthopedic Bone 
Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F.R.D. 154, 165 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Brown v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 
Nos. MDL 1203, 99-20593, 2001 WL 283163, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2001); United States v. 
Phillip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 145-46 (D.D.C. 2000); In re Dow Corning Corp., 250 
B.R. 298, 349 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000); but see United States v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 345 F.3d 866, 
886 (11th Cir. 2003); Brown v. Thompson, 252 F. Supp. 2d 312, 319-20 (E.D. Va. 2003), aff’d 374 
F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 15. Orthopedic, 202 F.R.D. at 165; In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., Nos. MDL 1203, 99-
20593, 2001 WL 283163, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2001); Phillip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 146, 
n.22; Dow Corning, 250 B.R. at 340. 
 16. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii), amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 [hereinafter MMA], Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 301, 117 
Stat. 2066, 2222 (2003). 
 17. There is no universal definition of “mass torts.”  However, one commonly accepted 
definition is found in the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, which states that: 
Mass torts litigation “emerges when an event or series of related events injure a large 
number of people or damage their property.”  A mass tort is defined by both the nature 
and number of claims; the claims must arise out of an identifiable event or product, 
affecting a very large number of people and causing a large number of lawsuits asserting 
personal injury or property damage to be filed. 
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.1, at 343 (2004) (quoting Advisory Comm. on 
Civil Rules & Working Group on Mass Torts, Report on Mass Tort Litigation 10 (Feb. 15, 1999), 
reprinted without appendices in 187 F.R.D. 293, 300 (1999)). This definition covers at least two 
distinct types of tort claims: mass accidents and dispersed mass torts.  See id. at 343-44; see also L. 
Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates 
Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 165 (2004) (adding property damage mass torts and 
economic loss torts to the list).  Mass accidents, or single event mass torts, “usually involve one 
catastrophic event that causes harm to a readily identifiable group of putative plaintiffs.”  Id. at 166.  
“[P]laintiffs in a single event mass tort share the common characteristics of time, place, and cause of 
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the fact that courts18 and academics19 have largely ignored this 
amendment – attorneys from around the country have sounded alarm 
bells since the government first took the litigation position now reflected 
in the MSP.  Lawyers have raised serious concerns about their ability to 
bring and settle individual and mass tort litigation under the MSP’s 
harsh liability rules.20 
injury.”  Working Group on Mass Torts, supra, at 10.  These torts are typified by airplane crashes, 
environmental hazards such as oil spills or chemical leaks, and fires.  Dispersed mass torts, in 
contrast, “typically arise from widespread use of, or exposures to, widely distributed products or 
substances. . . .”  MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra, at 344.  Dispersed mass torts 
generally arise in one of two ways: exposure to a pharmaceutical drug or devise that is removed 
from the market or exposure to a substance over a prolonged period of time.  Id.; see Chamblee, 
supra, at 168.  In the former category, the injured parties know that they were exposed to a 
particular substance over a relatively short period of time.  Examples of these cases are the anti-
cholesterol drug, Baycol; the diet drug, Phen Fen; and the anti-arthritis drug, Vioxx.  See MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra, at 344.  In the latter category, parties may have latent injuries 
that take years or even decades to develop.  See id.  Examples of latent injury claims include those 
related to asbestos, silicone gel breast implants, and radiation exposure.  Id. at 344-45.  This 
dichotomy is only somewhat helpful as mass accidents, like dispersed mass torts, can result in 
multi-jurisdictional, multi-party disputes.  Thus, it is best to think of these cases as arising on a 
continuum from cases that can easily be aggregated and litigated as one case to cases that are simply 
too diverse in terms of injury, operative law, and remedy to be aggregated with ease. 
 18. With the exception of Judge Weinstein in In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 451 
F. Supp. 2d 458, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), no court has addressed the settlement implications of the 
MSP.  This is not entirely unexpected.  Courts will rarely write about the true impact of the MSP 
because it generally affects the incentives for bringing or settling tort lawsuits – two areas in which 
the courts rarely write opinions.  See generally David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District 
Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008).  
 19. A review of the search results for “medicare /5 secondary” in the Westlaw JLR database 
yields only one academic article that addresses the topic.  See David B. Torrey, Compromise 
Settlements Under State Workers’ Compensation Acts: Law, Policy, Practice, and Ten Years of the 
Pennsylvania Experience, 16 WIDENER L. J. 199, 389-98 (2007) (addressing the implications of 
enforcement of the MSP act in the context of state worker's compensation “compromise and release 
agreements”). 
 20. Before the MMA, practitioners were concerned about their potential liability if the courts 
accepted the Secretary’s litigation position.  See e.g., Wesley S. Caldwell III, et al., The Medicare 
Secondary Payer Program and Its Implications for Personal Injury Clients, 47 SOC. SEC. REP. 
SERV. 807, 807 (1995) (warning that “[a]ttorneys should realize that Medicare may be lying in wait, 
poised to recapture prior medical payments from awards that were considered by the client to be 
safe and secure”); Thomas J. Nyzio, Medicare Recovery in Liability Cases, S. C. LAW., May-June 
1996, at 20, 23 (warning that “[i]n the event that Medicare’s interest is not repaid, anyone who 
could have protected Medicare’s interest may be liable for repayment,” and that “this even includes 
lawyers whose fees are paid from settlement proceeds”); H. Kennard Bennett, Settlement Issues in 
Nursing Home Cases: Medicare Liens, Medicaid and Other Complications, 2 NO. 11 ANDREWS 
NURSING HOME LITIG. REP. 11 (2000) (noting the “chilling effect” of Medicare liens on plaintiffs’ 
ability to bring lawsuits); Glenn E. Bradford & Melinda M. Ward, The Medicare “Super Lien” 
Revisited, 56 J. MO. B. 44, 44-45 (2000) (warning that “attorneys should proceed with caution” in 
the area of the Medicare “super lien” to protect against “later MSP collection efforts by the 
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In this article, I show that, as amended, the MSP will likely have 
unforeseen consequences to the tort system.  I start by reviewing the 
history of Medicare and the forces that led Congress to enact and amend 
the MSP.21  With illustration from the classic economic model of 
litigation, I then show that, not surprisingly, the MSP – as written – 
makes it more difficult for Medicare beneficiaries to bring and settle 
individual tort claims.22  What may be less obvious is that this 
amendment may have a profound impact in the area of mass tort 
litigation.  If individual parties to a mass tort cannot settle, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys, who make the litigation decisions in mass torts, may 
determine that it is not lucrative to include Medicare beneficiaries in 
mass tort litigation or to bring mass tort litigation at all.  This could have 
several consequences.  First, and most obviously, if certain plaintiffs 
government”); See Charles F. Preuss, Alan J. Lazarus & Krista L. Cosner, The Keys to Successfully 
Resolving Multi-District Litigation: The Problem of Federal Medical Liens (2004) (warning 
practitioners about the possibility of a Medicare lien and double damages). 
 After the amendment, although resigned to the inevitability of their difficulties, 
practitioners continued to sound the alarm.  See, e.g., John L. Tate & Demetrius O. Holloway, 
Medicare Liens:  A Stumbling Block to Settlement, 24 NO. 2 LJN'S PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY 8, 8 
(Aug. 2005) (“In cases involving catastrophic injury, . . . staggering [Medicare] liens often control 
the feasibility of reaching an acceptable [settlement] agreement.”); Thomas C. Regan & Seamus M. 
Morley, Deluding the Unwary: The Revised Medicare Secondary Payer Act, 47 NO. 1 DRI FOR DEF. 
47 (2005) (warning practitioners that “[i]t is imperative that you make yourself aware of the new 
provisions [of the MSP]” because “a relatively modest settlement can become an extremely 
expensive one in the blink of an eye”); Matthew L. Garretson, Making Sense of Medicare Set-
Asides: As Medicare’s Role in Workers’ Compensation and Liability Settlements Evolves, a Lack of 
Clear Guidance has Left Many Lawyers Perplexed, TRIAL, May 2006, at 64 (noting the frustration 
attorneys face deciphering their potential obligations to Medicare, and advising them to take a 
conservative approach); Frank Verderame, Medicare Reimbursement Claims, 1 ATLA ANN. 
CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 921 (2005) (calling the amended MSP “awful,” and warning 
lawyers to “[b]eware” of the changes); William E. Pipkin, Jr. & Conley W. Knott, In Plain 
Language: Medicare and the Secondary Payer Statute, 48 No. 3 DRI FOR DEF. 44 (Mar. 2006) 
(noting that the “MSP program fails to sufficiently account for” settlements where the merits of the 
underlying claim are in dispute); Robert S. Dampf, Mediations & Settlements: Applicability of the 
Medicare Secondary Payer Act, 54 LA. B. J. 173 (Oct.-Nov. 2006) (warning practitioners that if 
Medicare’s interests are ignored the government has a right to collect damages or, potentially, 
double damages); Walter C. Morrison, NAT’L BUS. INST., Settle Medical Negligence Cases 
Efficiently and Successfully 55, 60 (2006) (warning practitioners that it is “imperative” to know 
whether there is a possibility of Medicare recovery and the degree of liability when filing a lawsuit); 
Jules B. Olsman, Medicare Liens in Personal Injury Litigation, 2 ATLA ANN. CONVENTION 
REFERENCE MATERIALS 1811 (2006) (advising practitioners that “[t]here is no specific solution to 
this vexing problem” of Medicare liens); Patty L. Wisecup, Minding Medicare’s Interests: It May 
Preserve Your Fiscal Health, 64 BENCH & B. MINN. 25 (Feb. 2007) (warning practitioners of the 
potential repercussions of ignoring potential Medicare liability). 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
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cannot bring claims, they will not be appropriately compensated for their 
harms.  Moreover, if tortfeasors are not made to pay for their tortious 
conduct, they will not internalize the harms caused and will not take the 
proper amount of precaution to protect against future harms.  Further, if 
there are no mass tort actions, the Secretary will not have access to the 
discovery done by private litigation against these mass tort defendants.  
As such, the Secretary may have a harder time collecting Medicare’s 
conditional outlays from truly tortious parties.  Lastly, I offer a simple 
means to rectify this complex problem: force the Secretary to use the 
clear statutory right of subrogation against tortfeasors.23  Subrogation 
will not fundamentally change Medicare’s ability to recover its costs 
from an alleged tortfeasor, but will alleviate the disincentives to 
settlement in the tort setting. 
II. THE HISTORY OF THE MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER ACT 
Medicare began as and remains a government-sponsored insurance 
program.24  The legislation only gained popular and legislative support 
when its architects made clear that Medicare would not create a 
government handout.  Rather, as constructed by its architects and as it 
exists today, Medicare provides health insurance to a select set of the 
working population.  It is paid for by the working population and is 
meant to solve a gap in coverage created by the free market. 
In this section, I first trace the roots of the Medicare bill to show 
that Congress intended the program to be a social insurance program, not 
a welfare entitlement.  This is important because, as originally enacted, 
the MSP made sense specifically because Medicare functioned as an 
insurance program.  But, by amending the MSP as part of the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003, Congress granted the Secretary the right to 
recover from Medicare beneficiaries and alleged tortfeasors, which is at 
odds with the history of Medicare generally and the secondary payer 
provisions specifically.  Further, Congress created a remedy that is 
unknown in contract, tort, or insurance law. 
 23. See infra Part V. 
 24. See infra Part II.A. 
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A.  The Push for Government-Sponsored Health Insurance: the 
Progressives, the New Deal, the Fair Deal, and the Medicare 
Compromise 
As with most legislation, the Medicare story begins with idealistic 
notions and ends with fierce lobbying and politically expedient 
compromises.  By the time Congress passed Medicare as Title XVIII of 
the Social Security Amendments of 1965,25 this country had already 
rejected three attempts to pass some form of universal healthcare 
insurance – at the turn of the twentieth century, as a part of the New 
Deal, and as part of the Fair Deal.26  These proposals shared a unifying 
theme: the idea that healthcare costs would be paid through a social 
insurance scheme, not as a direct health benefit.  That is, the intended 
beneficiaries (whether industrial workers, all workers, or all citizens) 
would insure against identifiable risks to individual beneficiaries by 
contributing to a fund large enough to guarantee benefits if the covered 
risk occurs.27 
The first push in the United States for government-sponsored health 
insurance derived from a nineteenth-century movement in Europe for 
compulsory healthcare for industrial workers.  In 1883, Germany, under 
Chancellor Otto von Bismark, embraced the “social insurance” 
philosophy by enacting the German Sickness Insurance Act, which 
created a redistributive model for the provision of medical care for 
industrial workers.28  Between 1883 and 1913, ten other European 
countries adopted some form of compulsory healthcare insurance for 
their workers.29  The United States, which at that time “was peculiarly 
 25. Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 291-343 
(1965). 
 26. See JONATHAN OBERLANDER, THE POLITICAL LIFE OF MEDICARE 18 (2003) (“Medicare 
represented the fourth wave in the campaign for national health insurance in the United States.”). 
 27. Public health insurance, like private health insurance, “covers individuals against the costs 
of unpredictable illness and disability by sharing individual financial risks across a large 
population.”  NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SOCIAL INSURANCE, MEDICARE AND THE AMERICAN SOCIAL 
CONTRACT 31 (1999), www.nasi.org/usr_doc/med_report_soc_contract.pdf.  Common risks dealt 
with under social insurance are old age, ill health or injury, and unemployment.  See id. 
 28. OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 18; SUE A. BLEVINS, MEDICARE’S MIDLIFE CRISIS 25 
(2001). 
 29. The following European countries introduced some form of compulsory medical care at 
the turn of the twentieth century:  Austria (1888), Hungary (1891), Denmark (1892), Luxembourg 
(1901), Norway (1909), Serbia (1910), Great Britain (1911), Russia (1912), Romania (1912), and 
the Netherlands (1913).  Id.  By 1940, every western European country had some form of 
government health insurance program for at least its lowest-income workers.  THEODORE MARMOR, 
POLITICS OF MEDICARE 7 (1973). 
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open to foreign models and imported ideas,” considered following suit.30  
In this country, two lobbying organizations led the charge to create a 
healthcare entitlement: the American Association for Labor Legislation 
(“AALL”), a political group of academics, lawyers, and other 
progressives, and the American Medical Association (“AMA”), led by 
urban, academically minded doctors.31  In 1912, influenced, in part, by 
the progressive stance of the AALL and the AMA, Theodore Roosevelt 
included compulsory health insurance for industrial workers as part of 
his platform for president.  Although Roosevelt lost the 1912 election, 
the AALL and the AMA continued to push for a governmental solution 
to the issue of healthcare.32 
These lobbying efforts did not go unchecked.  The insurance 
industry, pharmaceutical companies, and organized labor united to 
oppose nationalized health care.  In particular, Samuel Gompers, the 
president of the American Federation of Labor, claimed that any form of 
compulsory health care would be a means for the government to control 
industrial workers.33  The insurance and pharmaceutical industry 
opposed compulsory healthcare for business reasons, claiming that 
compulsory governmental healthcare would eliminate the need for 
private insurance and stifle the development of the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
This first push for compulsory healthcare ended by the time the 
United States entered World War I.  After 1917, those who opposed 
universal healthcare poisoned the debate by arguing that nationalized  
 
 30. DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A PROGRESSIVE AGE 4 
(1998) (arguing, in part, that after the end of the American Civil War, but before the United States 
took its place as a super power after World War II, the United States was more open to the 
influences of European countries than ever before or since).  American politicians were particularly 
influenced by Great Britain’s insertion of a program for health insurance for low-income workers 
into a more general social security program that provided pensions, unemployment compensation, 
and sickness benefits.  See MARMOR, supra note 29, at 7; BLEVINS, supra note 28, at 26. 
 31. See OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 18; MARMOR, supra note 29, at 7. 
 32. See OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 18. 
 33. OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 20, MARMOR, supra note 29, at 7.  In part Gompers 
feared that any form social insurance would draw workers closer to the state at the expense of the 
unions.  See generally DANIEL S. HIRSHFIELD, THE LOST REFORM: THE CAMPAIGN FOR 
COMPULSORY HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1932 TO 1943 20 (1970). 
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healthcare was a foothold to socialism and Bolshevism.34  By 1920, the 
AMA withdrew its support as rural and private doctors took control of 
the organization’s message from the urban, academic doctors.  Rural and 
private doctors were influenced both by the comparison to socialism and 
by a concern that compulsory health insurance would negatively impact 
their income and social status.35  Without support and without a strategy 
to combat the smear campaign, the first movement toward compulsory 
healthcare ended. 
The second push for compulsory healthcare began with Franklin 
Roosevelt and the New Deal.36  During the Great Depression, the 
unemployment and poverty rates among the elderly grew at drastic 
rates.37  Although approximately thirty States had some form of old-age 
pension by 1935, only 3% of the elderly received benefits and the 
average benefit was only $0.65 per day.38  Three significant reasons 
prevented the elderly from receiving benefits under these State plans: a) 
significant social stigma and objection to being on the government dole; 
b) complicated eligibility requirements that precluded many seniors from 
receiving these benefits, and c) although States adopted the legislation, 
individual counties failed to put the welfare plans into action.39  Thus, 
the efficacy of State welfare programs suffered significantly. 
In 1934, Roosevelt created the advisory Committee on Economic 
Security (“CES”) to seek a method to provide minimum income for the 
aged, unemployed, blind, and the widowed.40  The CES based the 
proposed Social Security bill on the social insurance model, and paid out 
retirement benefits based on contributions paid into the fund through 
 34. BLEVINS, supra note 28, at 27:   
Before World War I, American reformers looked to Europe for policy models and 
argued that the United States had fallen behind its European counterparts . . . .  [After 
1917], that strategy had backfired.  ‘The very explicitness of the American borrowings  
. . . all became potential liabilities after 1917.   
OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 20 (quoting RODGERS, supra note 30, at 257). 
 35. See BLEVINS, supra note 28, at 27 (“The links with Germany and Russia created a 
postwar reaction to progressivism that dampened enthusiasm for social insurance in the United 
States.”). 
 36. OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 20-21. 
 37. Unemployment rates reached over twenty-five percent during the Depression and some 
estimates suggest that in 1934 over half of the elderly could not support themselves.  Social Security 
Administration, Historical Background and Developments in Social Security, paras. 30, 40, 
http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited December 2006). 
 38. Id. at para. 30. 
 39. Id. at para. 31. 
 40. MARMOR, supra note 29, at 8. 
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compulsory payroll taxes.41  This model had several significant political 
benefits.  First, it removed some of the stigma from the notion of 
welfare, because individuals believed that they were receiving benefits 
based on what they paid in.42  Second, because all workers contributed 
and all workers received benefits, the program received broad support 
across generations and classes.  No one felt that another group was being 
given a handout.43 
The proposed Social Security bill from the CES originally included 
a one-line proposal to authorize a study of compulsory health insurance.  
However, that single line motivated the AMA to oppose the entire bill.44  
As Edwin Witte, the chair of the Committee on Economic Security 
remarked: “that little line was responsible for so many telegrams to the 
members of Congress that the entire social security program seemed 
endangered until the Ways and Means Committee unanimously struck it 
out of the bill.”45  Fearing that support for the entire Social Security bill 
would evaporate, the Roosevelt administration withdrew its support for a 
national health insurance program.46  The Social Security bill passed in 
193547 without mention of compulsory health insurance, and with that, 
the second push for compulsory healthcare effectively died.48 
The third push for compulsory health insurance began with Senator 
Robert Wagner (D., N.Y.) who in 1935 first introduced legislation to 
remove income as a barrier to accessing medical care.49  Although he 
failed to gain support for this bill, Senator Wagner continued to push 
annually for universal healthcare.  By 1943, Senator James Murray (D. 
Mont.) and Representative John Dingell, Sr. (D., Mich.) had joined 
Wagner’s annual appeal for comprehensive health insurance for all 
 41. See OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 77-78. 
 42. See id. at 79 (“The trust fund was seen, in effect, as the public property of the individuals 
who had paid into it, not simply as another government program that went to help ‘others.’”). 
 43. See id.  
 44. See id. at 21. 
 45. See EUGENE FEINGOLD, MEDICARE: POLICY AND POLITICS 91 (1966); MARMOR, supra 
note 29, at 8. 
 46. See MARMOR, supra note 29, at 8; OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 47. 
 47. Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). 
 48. The AMA and other critics saw the Social Security bill as the first step toward a health 
care entitlement.  See MARMOR, supra note 29, at 9.  See also JAMES G. BURROW, AMA: VOICE OF 
AMERICAN MEDICINE 197 (1963).  In an effort to limit government action in the health care arena, 
the AMA endorsed private health care insurance such as Blue Cross for hospitalization and Blue 
Shield for surgical and medical expenses.  MARMOR, supra note 29, at 9.  Interestingly, these 
programs, in turn, became the model for Medicare’s Part A and Part B. 
 49. MARMOR, supra note 29, at 10. 
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citizens.50  In 1948, Harry Truman supported the Wagner-Murray-
Dingell bill in his run for the Presidency, even though he knew that the 
bill would never pass the Republican-controlled Congress.51  After 
taking office in 1949, Truman again pushed for a national health 
insurance program as part of his Fair Deal policy for social change.52  
Truman, like Roosevelt, met stalwart opposition from the medical 
profession.  The AMA launched another campaign to defeat nationalized 
health care, capitalizing on the red scare and linking nationalized health 
insurance to a fear of a Communist takeover.  The AMA also warned 
that government insurance would ruin the quality of care by reducing the 
incentives for physicians to provide quality services.  Together with 
Blue Cross, the AMA again pushed private insurance as the alternative 
solution.53  By 1950, the AMA’s campaign against government-
sponsored healthcare of any kind had been credited with the defeat of at 
least three congressmen who had been in favor of Truman’s plan.54  
And, with that, the third campaign for national health insurance ended. 
After the collapse of the Fair Deal proposal, a small group of 
national health care advocates designed a new strategy to garner support 
for health care.55  Rather than try to provide nationalized health 
insurance for the entire population, the new proposal had smaller aims.  
The architects of the new Medicare proposal intended to provide limited 
insurance benefits to a small, but vulnerable population so that the most 
vulnerable could avoid complete financial collapse.  The new bill 
provided aid only to those over sixty-five and only to those already 
participating in the Social Security system.  To this group, the bill 
provided assistance for sixty days of hospitalization, sixty days of 
nursing home care, and some surgical benefits.56  Further, by grafting 
Medicare onto the Social Security program, Medicare’s architects made 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 11.  Proponents of the Fair Deal legislation had a greater distributive goal than 
earlier movements.  As stated in the 1952 report of President Truman’s Commission on the Health 
Needs of the Nation, “[a]ccess to the means of attainment and preservation of health, is a basic 
human right.”  Id. at 10.  As Marmor observed, “New Deal-Fair Deal champions of medical care 
proposals did not view it primarily as a measure to further income security but as a remedy for the 
inequitable distribution of medical services.”  Id. at 9-10. 
 52. Id. at 11. 
 53. OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 22.  See MARMOR, supra note 29, at 12; see supra notes 
48 and accompanying text. 
 54. See OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 22. 
 55. Id. at 23. 
 56. SHERI I. DAVID, WITH DIGNITY: THE SEARCH FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID 3 (1985); 
MARMOR, supra note 29, at 15. 
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sure that the public understood that the bill provided an earned benefit, 
not a welfare entitlement. 
As with the original push for Social Security, the focus on the 
elderly had both practical and sentimental appeal.  On the practical side, 
many elderly were left with no real options for private insurance.  
Although labor unions made great strides in the 1950s by obtaining 
private health insurance for their members from employers, this 
insurance generally ended at the time of retirement.57  Non-profit 
organizations like Blue Cross and Blue Shield initially provided some 
coverage for retirees.  However, as the market moved healthy workers 
into private insurance, these non-profit organizations increasingly only 
insured high-risk individuals.  As such, the non-profits had to raise 
premiums simply to stay in business, and by 1958, this insurance “was 
out of the price range of those living on a pension or Social Security 
checks.”58  With premiums on the rise from non-profits and private 
insurers loath to offer health insurance to the elderly, those over sixty-
five were often left with no real means to insure themselves.  Further, 
the elderly had vast political appeal, and to the extent they were viewed 
as needy, they were also considered deserving.  Thus, limiting the 
proposal to the elderly provided some political cover, while still 
advancing the cause of national health insurance, if only incrementally.59 
As planned, Medicare gained credibility because of this connection 
to Social Security, which had gained widespread acceptance.  As with 
Social Security, individuals paid in over time and received benefits upon 
their sixty-fifth birthday.  In a country that was “traditionally skeptical of 
public assistance to ‘undeserving’ recipients, the notion that social 
welfare benefits had been earned was politically crucial.”60  Thus, the 
Medicare proposal lacked the usual stigma associated with welfare 
programs. 
Despite these strategies, the debate over the Medicare proposal 
raged throughout the Eisenhower and Kennedy (1953-63) 
administrations.  During this time, the proposals for Medicare’s 
 57. DAVID, supra note 56, at 4. 
 58. Id. 
 59. OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 24; see MARMOR, supra note 29, at 16-17.  Likewise, the 
decision to limit the scope of benefits provided was politically expedient.  Because Medicare’s 
architects believed that large-scale change was out of the question, they aimed to protect the elderly 
from financial catastrophes resulting from illness.  At the time, hospitalization represented the 
greatest threat.  See OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 25. 
 60. See OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 24. 
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coverage changed, but the bill remained limited in scope and continued 
to target Social Security beneficiaries.  And, as before, objections from 
conservatives and the AMA focused on the evils of Socialism.  This 
time, however, new liberal lobbying efforts rebuffed the AMA’s 
attacks.61  One group in particular shouldered the lobbying burden for 
Medicare, a group called the National Council of Senior Citizens, which 
was financed by the AFL-CIO specifically to lobby for Medicare.62  
Thus, despite its early rejection of national health care, by the time 
Congress enacted Medicare, organized labor fully supported the 
proposal. 
In 1964, Lyndon Johnson won the presidential election, swept a 
Democratic majority into Congress, and Medicare finally had the 
Congressional backing it required.63  Seeing the writing on the wall, 
Republicans and the AMA offered different proposals to shape 
Medicare.  Under the Republican proposal, the government would 
subsidize the premium payments the elderly made for private insurance.  
This proposal would have been financed two-thirds from the public 
coffers and one third from premium payments.  The AMA, in turn, 
proposed Eldercare, a state administered program to subsidize private 
health insurance for the poor.64 
On July 30, 1965, President Johnson signed Medicare into law as 
Title XVIII of the Social Security Amendments of 1965.65  This bill 
included elements of the proposals from the Democrats, the 
Republicans, and the AMA: hospitalization insurance (Part A),66 a 
voluntary outpatient medical insurance program for the aged and 
disabled (Part B),67 and an expanded program of federal assistance for 
 61. See generally MARMOR, supra note 29, at 23-28. 
 62. See id. at 24. 
 63. OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 29. 
 64. See OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 30. 
 65. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). 
 66. Part A of the Title XVIII of the Social Security Act of 1965, Publ. L. No. 89-97, covers 
“inpatient hospital care, home care, hospice care, and care in a skilled nursing facility.”  BLEVINS, 
supra note 28, at 5.  Medicare beneficiaries are required to pay a deductible for each hospitalization.  
Id.  Part A was and is financed through the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (“HI”).  Id.  The HI trust 
fund is financed by a 2.9% payroll tax – workers and employers each contribute 1.45% of workers’ 
earnings.  Id.  Although it is called a trust fund, the money taken out of each person’s paycheck is 
not set aside for his or her own future healthcare costs; rather, today’s Medicare taxes pay for the 
costs of today’s beneficiaries.  Id. 
 67. Supplementary Medical Insurance (“SMI”), established in Part B of Title XVIII, provides 
benefits for outpatient services, home health services, durable medical equipment, and diagnostic 
tests.  See generally TERRY S. COLEMAN, MEDICARE LAW (2001); Eric Patashnik & Julian Zelizer, 
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the poor (Medicaid).  Over time, Medicare expanded to include private 
medical insurance programs68 and insurance for prescription drugs.69 
Despite this achievement, the original bill and its later expansions 
reflect the United States’ deep ambivalence for welfare benefits.  Rather 
than allow Congress to create a government entitlement, the forces that 
aligned against universal health care – conservatives, the pharmaceutical 
industry, and the AMA – made sure that Medicare followed a 
recognizable insurance model.  That is, Congress ensured that the 
hospitalization benefit of Part A and the medical insurance of Part B 
reflected the expressed desire for a government-sponsored insurance 
scheme.   
As discussed below, the Medicare Secondary Payer Act best makes 
sense within the context of an insurance paradigm.  But by amending the 
MSP, Congress created a remedy that has no basis in contract, tort, or 
insurance law.70 
B.  Medicare As a Secondary Payer: An Insurance Based Approach 
To Fiscal Change 
As originally enacted in 1965, Medicare was the primary insurer, 
and thus the primary payer, for medical services provided to Medicare 
beneficiaries, with one exception: if the Secretary reasonably expected a 
Paying for Medicare: Benefits, Budgets, and Wilbur Mill’s Policy Legacy, 26 J. HEALTH POL. 
POL’Y & L. 7 (2001).  Part B is a voluntary program financed by general Treasury revenues and 
premiums paid by the insured.  Under Part B, Medicare pays 80% (after seniors pay a $100 
deductible) of the services covered under Part B.  BLEVINS, supra note 28, at 5.  In 2001, 
approximately 73% of Part B was financed through general tax revenues, 23% was financed by 
premiums paid by seniors; and 4% was financed by interest and other miscellaneous income.  Id. 
 68. In 1997, Congress created Medicare Part C.  See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 
No. 105-33, § 4001, 11 Stat. 251, 275 (1997).  Under Part C, which was originally called 
Medicare+Choice, individuals who receive benefits under Part A and Part B can purchase private 
insurance through the Medicare program and receive their care through coordinated care plans.  See 
SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, MEDICARE ELECTRONIC BOOKLET 3, 7, Publication No. 05-10043 
(Sept. 2007), available at http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10043.pdf; 2005-2006 MEDICARE HANDBOOK § 
1.01 (Judith A. Stein & Alfred J. Chiplin, Jr., eds. Aspen Publishers 2006); BLEVINS, supra note 28, 
at 5-6.  In 2003, Congress changed the name of Part C to Medicare Advantage.  See MMA, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
 69. “Part D initially provided access to prescription drug discount cards and transitional 
assistance to low-income beneficiaries.”  2006 THE BDS. OF TRS. OF THE FED. HOSP. INS.AND FED. 
SUPPLEMENTARY INS. TRUST FUNDS ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2006) [hereinafter 2006 MEDICARE ANN. 
REP.].  After 2006, Part D provides subsidized access to drug insurance on a voluntary basis for all 
Medicare beneficiaries and premium and cost-sharing subsidies for low-income beneficiaries.  Id.; 
see MMA, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
 70. See infra Part III. 
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workmen’s compensation plan to cover a beneficiary’s claims, Medicare 
would only make payment on the condition that the workmen’s 
compensation plan would reimburse Medicare.71  In other words, if a 
beneficiary was entitled to have a worker’s compensation plan pay for 
her medical services, Medicare would act only as a secondary insurer, 
i.e. a secondary payer. 
Other than that exception, from 1965 until 1980, Medicare paid 
benefits without regard to whether another insurer covered the 
services.72  Other insurance companies, in fact, wrote their insurance 
policies around Medicare to fill the gaps created for those over 65.73  
During this period, however, Medicare expenses rapidly expanded 
beyond Congress’ initial expectation,74 and Congress scrambled to reign 
in the program’s spending. 
Medicare spending is a function of four factors: (a) the number of 
 71. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1862(b), 79 Stat. 286, 325 
(1965).  In 1965, section 1862(b) of the Social Security Act stated: 
(b) Payment under this title may not be made with respect to any item or service to the 
extent that payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made (as 
determined in accordance with regulations), with respect to such item or service, under a 
workmen’s compensation law or plan of the United States or a State.  Any payment 
under this title with respect to any item or service shall be conditioned on reimbursement 
to the appropriate Trust Fund established by this title when notice or other information is 
received that payment for such item or service has been made under such a law or plan. 
Id.; see also Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n v. Sullivan, 794 F. Supp. 1166, 1168 (D.D.C. 1992) 
(noting that “[f]rom its inception until 1980, Medicare was the primary source of payment for the 
medical expenses for nearly all of its beneficiaries” except when “payments had been, or reasonably 
could have been, made by a workers compensation law or plan”) aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other 
grounds sub nom Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1994); In re Dow 
Corning Corp., 250 B.R. 298, 335 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (“Except for worker’s compensation 
plans, Medicare was made the ‘primary payer’ for the health care claims of federal beneficiaries . . . 
.”). 
 72. From 1965 until 1980, Medicare was the “primary payer” for the “health care claims of 
federal beneficiaries with the beneficiaries’ other health insurance plans filling in some or all of the 
coverage gaps” for all claims other than claims arising under worker’s compensation plans.  Dow 
Corning, 250 B.R. at 335; see also Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d at 414; In re 
Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 73. See Sullivan, 794 F. Supp. at 1168 (“[Prior to 1980] most insurance companies’ contracts 
with employers and [employer group health plans] only covered ‘secondary’ costs.”). 
 74. “In its first years, Medicare costs vastly outpaced the actuarial projections made at the 
time of its enactment.”  OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 47.  In 1968 and 1969, costs rose at an 
average annual rate of 40.2%, prompting Russell Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, 
to warn that Medicare had become a “a runaway program.”  Id.  In its first five years, Medicare 
spending increased by more than 70% – from $4.6 billion in 1967 to $7.9 billion in 1971 – while the 
number of enrollees only grew by 6% from 19.5 to 20.7 million.  BLEVINS, supra note 28, at 59-60 
(citing Theodore Marmor & Julie Beglin, Medicare and How it Grew. . . and Grew. . .  and Grew, 
BOSTON GLOBE, May 7, 1995). 
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Medicare beneficiaries; (b) the prices paid for services, which reflect 
both wages for health care workers and price of the goods and services 
purchased by health care providers; (c) the number of services consumed 
by the beneficiaries; and (d) the average complexity of the services, i.e., 
the intensity of those services.75  To some extent, the expenditures prior 
to 1980 rose because Congress expanded the number of beneficiaries 
eligible to receive services and because of inflation.76  But neither 
inflation nor new enrollees can account for all of the increases in 
Medicare expenditures, as is clear when one looks at real dollar 
expenditures per enrollee.  From 1967 through 1980, the total Medicare 
expenditures and administrative costs per enrollee rose rapidly.  In 2005 
dollars, Medicare spent $976.50 per enrollee in 1967; by 1970, Medicare 
spent $1,741.55 per enrollee, and by 1980, $3,090.97 per enrollee.77  
Thus, one is left with the conclusion that the “volume of services” 
rendered to enrollees and the “intensity of [those] services” accounts for 
a great deal of the increase, and not the number of enrollees or the cost 
of the services.78 
In December 1980, Congress passed, and President Carter signed, 
the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980,79 with the explicit intent of 
reducing the deficit.80  This Act included the Medicare and Medicaid 
 75. 2006 MEDICARE ANN. REP., supra note 69, at 30.  One can also think of intensity as “the 
average complexity of the services reimbursed by Medicare.  It can reflect not only technological 
progress, such as the ability to do open-heart surgery, but also changes in accounting practices and 
the coding of claims by health care providers to optimize Medicare payments.”  Richard S. Foster, 
Trends in Medicare Expenditures and Financial Status 1966-2000, 22 HEALTH CARE FIN. REV. 35, 
37 n.1 (2000). 
 76. In 1972, Medicare extended its coverage beyond the aged to two new categories of 
beneficiaries: the disabled and end-stage renal disease patients.  See OBERLANDER, supra note 26, at 
40; Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972). 
 77. See RONALD J. VOGEL, MEDICARE: ISSUES IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 18 (1999) (adjusted 
to real 2005 dollars). 
 78. See id. at 19.  Vogel also persuasively shows that various exogenous schemes (such as 
wage and price controls, voluntary efforts by the American Hospital Association and the American 
Medical Association to control hospital costs and medical fees, and a fee schedule set by Medicare) 
had little effect on the rise in Medicare spending.  See id. at 17-19. 
 79. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599 (1980). 
 80. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1167, at 1 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5527 
(reporting on the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980) (“When Congress approved the budget 
targets for fiscal year 1981, it agreed that growth in Federal spending should be restrained.”); Id. at 
2. 
The Congress took unprecedented action by directing that these legislative changes be 
accomplished through the reconciliation process.  To implement these spending and 
revenue policies. . . .  Congress directed its spending and tax-writing committees to 
examine the laws within their jurisdictions and to recommend legislative changes which 
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Amendments of 1980.81  The bulk of the Medicare amendments were 
aimed at regulating the services provided under Medicare82 and 
eliminating fraud and waste in the system.83  Thus, Congress attempted 
to control Medicare’s rising costs by limiting the volume and intensity of 
services provided to Medicare beneficiaries. 
Inserted among these other changes was a little-discussed 
amendment to section 1862(b) of the Social Security Act, which has 
come to be known as the Medicare Secondary Payer Act.  Under the 
1980 Amendment, for the first time since Medicare’s inception, 
Congress made Medicare’s liability secondary to additional sources of 
payment for Medicare beneficiaries’ medical costs and services.84  In 
addition to workers’ compensation, Congress included automobile, 
liability, and no-fault insurance as payers of first resort.  As before, if the 
Secretary reasonably expected any of these insurance plans to cover a 
beneficiary’s claims, Medicare would only pay for the beneficiary’s 
medical care when the Secretary could expect “reimbursement” for 
Medicare’s payments.85  “The intent of this statute was to cut the costs 
of the Medicare program by requiring that Medicare pay ‘secondary’ to 
would result in substantial savings in fiscal year 1981. 
Id. 
 81. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 900, et seq., 94 Stat. 2599, 
2609 (1980). 
 82. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, §§ 930-939, 94 Stat. 2631-
40 (1980). 
 83. See Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, §§ 911-929, 94 Stat. 2619-
31 (1980). 
 84. After the Medicare and Medicaid Amendments of 1980, section 1862(b) stated: 
Payment under this title may not be made with respect to any item or service to the 
extent that payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made (as 
determined in accordance with regulations), with respect to such item or service, under a 
workmen’s compensation law or plan of the United States or a State or under an 
automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including a self-insured plan) or under 
no fault insurance.  Any payment under this title with respect to any item or service shall 
be conditioned on reimbursement to the appropriate Trust Fund established by this title 
when notice or other information is received that payment for such item or service has 
been made under such a law or plan, policy, plan, or insurance.  The Secretary may 
waive the provisions of this subsection in the case of an individual claim if he determines 
that the probability of recovery or amount involved in such claim does not warrant the 
pursuing of the claim. 
Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1862(b), 79 Stat 286, 325 (1965) (prior 
version); Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 953, 94 Stat. 2599, 2647 
(1980) (amendment in italics). 
 85. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-499, § 953, 94 Stat. 2599, 2647 
(1980). 
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alternate sources.”86  In other words, Congress ostensibly intended to 
save money by shifting the costs of beneficiaries’ medical care from the 
Medicare program to private sources of payment.87 
The legislative history reflects little debate and scholars and 
commentators largely ignored the amendment to the MSP.  Neither the 
House nor the Senate report predicted that this provision would result in 
significant savings.  The House Report predicted that after one year, this 
provision would save $8 million and by fiscal year 1985 it would save 
$112 million.88  This is virtually insignificant compared to overall 
Medicare expenditures in 1980 and 1985: $35 and $71.4 billion 
respectively (a reduction of 0.02% and 0.16% respectively).89  Further, 
there is little, if any, recorded debate about the wisdom of this change; 
the legislative record contains minimal discussion about the provision.90  
Likewise, there was no real scholarly work on the provision after these 
amendments.91 
 86. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n v. Sullivan, 794 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (D.D.C. 1992). 
 87. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER 
(MSP) MANUAL, REV. 34, § 10 (Sept. 7, 2005). 
 88. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 522 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5885. 
 89. See 2006 MEDICARE ANN. REP., supra note 69, at 187. 
 90. The House and Senate Reports do little more than repeat the wording of the statute.  See 
generally H.R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 389, 522 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 
5752, 5885 (explaining that the amendment will give Medicare “residual rather than primary 
liability for the payment of services required by a beneficiary as a result of an injury or illness 
sustained in an auto accident. . . .” and providing the amendment’s budgetary effects in cost 
reduction); H.R. REP. NO. 96-1479, at 133 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5903, 5924 (noting differences between the House, Senate, and Conference versions, but failing to 
discuss the import of those differences); STAFF OF COMM. ON THE BUDGET, 96TH CONG., 
RECONCILIATION (S. 2885) AND SPECIAL RULES FOR ITS CONSIDERATION TOGETHER WITH THE 
REPORTS TO THE BUDGET COMMITTEE OF THE INSTRUCTED COMMITTEES 92-93, 153 (Comm. Print 
1980). 
 91. A Westlaw search of the JLR database, with search term “Medicare w/5 secondary” and 
restricted to 1978-1990 yielded only articles by the Practicing Law Institute.  Nor have later books 
or articles on the history of Medicare discussed this provision in depth.  Although academics and 
practitioners largely ignored the amendment, insurance companies may have been concerned about 
this change, as it likely impacted their bottom line for contracts already written.  The paradigmatic 
case after the 1980 Amendments was that of a Medicare beneficiary hit by a tortious driver.  Before 
the 1980 Amendments, Medicare would pay for a beneficiary’s hospital stay and certain medical 
services regardless of whether either party had automobile insurance or whether the State had no-
fault insurance.  Private insurance (to the extent that the driver had it) would only pay to fill in the 
gaps left by Medicare’s coverage.  After the 1980 Amendments, the driver’s private insurance 
company had to pay for the beneficiary’s medical care.  See, e.g., Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Heckler, 
721 F.2d 431, 435 (3d Cir. 1983); Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F. Supp. 1155, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).  
Thus, we can imagine that insurance companies had to pay more for medical costs for elderly that 
were injured in auto accidents, because Medicare refused to pay for medical costs that it used to 
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From 1980 until 2003, Congress amended the Medicare Secondary 
Payer Act a number of times.  Each of these amendments “expanded the 
scope of the MSP scheme.”92  But until 2003, the MSP kept its same 
basic shape.93  The first paragraph of the MSP imposed certain 
requirements on group health plans.94  For instance, a non-exclusion 
provision required group health plans offered by employers – except for 
those provided by small employers – to provide the same benefits to the 
aged employees and aged employees’ spouses as to other employees and 
spouses.95  Similar provisions provided that group health plans could 
“not take into account” that an individual was disabled or suffering from 
end stage renal disease.96  In short, these provisions nullified any private 
plan provision “that would ‘carve out’ expenses covered by Medicare 
cover.  Private insurance companies likely increased their premiums to cover these anticipated 
additional costs. 
 92. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n v. Sullivan, 794 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 n.5 (D.D.C. 
1992).  For example, in 1981, Congress added secondary payer provisions for Medicare services 
provided to individuals receiving benefits to treat end-stage renal disease.  See Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2146, 95 Stat. 357, 800-01 (1981).  The next year, 
Congress truly expanded the scope of the statute by requiring employers who provide health 
insurance to employees to provide the same coverage to employees aged sixty-five to sixty-nine and 
making the group health plan the primary insurer.  Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 116, 96 Stat. 324, 353-54 (1982). That is, Congress required employers 
to treat those over sixty-five the same as those under sixty-five with respect to the provision of 
medical benefits.  In addition to expanding the scope of the MSP, Congress expanded the 
Secretary’s ability to recover for those benefits by adding an explicit cause of action for the 
government to recover when a primary plan failed to pay; see Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-369 § 2344(a)–(c); 98 Stat. 494, 1095-96 (1984), and a private cause of action to recover 
against primary plans, which included incentives to encourage private citizens to recover on behalf 
of Medicare, see Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509 § 9319(b), 100 Stat. 
1874, 2011 (1986) (allowing double damages against a primary plan).  See also Social Security Act 
Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-432 § 151(a)(1)(A), 108 Stat. 4398, 4432-33 (1994) 
(requiring the Secretary to send a questionnaire to new beneficiaries to determine if the beneficiary 
had other insurance that should be considered a primary plan). 
 93. In 1989, Congress redrafted the MSP into its current structure.  See Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239 § 6202, 103 Stat. 2106, 2225-35 (1989). 
 94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1) (2002).  Borrowing from the Internal Revenue Code, the 
MSP defines group health plans both as small group health plans:  “a plan (including a self-insured 
plan) of, or contributed to by, an employer (including a self-employed person) or employee 
organization to provide health care (directly or otherwise) to the employees, former employees, the 
employer, others associated or formerly associated with the employer in a business relationship, or 
their families,” and large group health plans: a small group health plan “that covers employees of at 
least one employer that normally employed at least 100 employees on a typical business day during 
the previous calendar year.”  See id. at (b)(1)(A)(v), (B)(iii) (citing to 26 U.S.C. § 5000(b)(1) and 
(2)).  For purposes of this paper, there is little reason to distinguish between the two and I will refer 
to both small group health plans and large group health plans simply as “group health plans.” 
 95. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1)(A)(i)(II) (2002). 
 96. See id. § 1395(y)(b)(1)(B) and (C). 
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and thus, in effect, make the plan’s coverage secondary to Medicare.”97  
These provisions reduced the number of beneficiaries for whom 
Medicare was the primary payer and concomitantly expanded the 
number of private primary payers. 
The second paragraph of the MSP provided the means by which 
Medicare became the secondary payer with respect to coverage required 
under the first paragraph and provided the mechanism for recovery 
where the primary plan failed to make payments.  Subparagraph (A) 
stated that Medicare would not pay for any medical service for a 
Medicare beneficiary where a “primary plan” – defined as a group health 
plan, large group health plan, workman’s compensation plan, an 
automobile or liability insurance plan (including a self-insured plan), or 
no fault insurance – provided medical insurance for the beneficiary and 
Medicare expected the insurer to pay for the beneficiaries’ medical care 
“promptly.”98 
Although this provision of the MSP was never a model of “clarity 
and coherence,”99 courts read it charitably,100 holding that the statute 
 97. Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 98. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2) (2002); see also Health Ins. Ass’n Am., Inc., 23 F.3d at 414-15 
(discussing the statutory scheme before the MMA).  Subparagraph (A) stated in relevant part: 
Payment under [the Medicare program] may not be made … with respect to any item or 
service to the extent that -- 
(i)  payment has been made, or can reasonably be expected to be made, … as required 
[under a group health plan], or 
(ii)  payment has been made or can reasonably be expected to be made promptly (as 
determined in accordance with regulations) under a workmen's compensation law or plan 
of the United States or a State or  under an automobile or  liability insurance policy or 
plan (including a self-insurance plan) or under no fault insurance. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Subparagraph (B) allowed the Secretary to make conditional payments and 
created a cause of action against recalcitrant primary plans. Subparagraph (B) stated in relevant part: 
(i) Primary Plans 
Any payment under this subchapter … shall be conditioned on reimbursement to the 
appropriate Trust Fund established by this subchapter when notice or other information 
is received that payment for such item or service has been or could be made under such 
subparagraph…. 
(ii) Action by United States 
In order to recover payment under this subchapter for such an item or service, the United 
States may bring an action against any entity which is required or responsible (directly, 
as a third-party administrator, or otherwise) to make payment with respect to such item 
or service (or any portion thereof) under a  primary plan …, or against any other entity 
(including any physician or provider) that has received payment from that entity with 
respect to the item or service, and may join or intervene in any action related to the 
events that gave rise to the need for the item or service. . . . 
Id. at § 1395y(b)(2)(B) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 99. Brown v. Thompson, 252 F. Supp. 2d 312, 317 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2003).  For example, the 
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worked as follows: If a Medicare beneficiary had medical insurance 
provided by a primary plan, then Medicare could not pay for the 
beneficiary’s medical services except to provide secondary coverage.  If 
the primary plan failed to pay or reimburse Medicare, the Secretary 
could make a conditional payment on the beneficiary’s behalf.  The 
Secretary could then seek reimbursement for those payments by suing 
the insurance entity that should have provided the primary coverage for 
the amount of the conditional payment or for double damages.101 
In sum, before the amendments to the MSP, if the Secretary 
reasonably expected that another insurer would pay for the beneficiary’s 
medical costs, the other insurer – not Medicare – was primary.  Where it 
was unclear whether a primary insurer was responsible or where a 
primary insurer was not likely to pay promptly for costs associated with 
treating the beneficiary, Medicare made payments to the health care 
provider expecting that it could (and would) recover from the rightful 
primary insurer.   
What is clear from this is what the MMA ignored. Before 2003, the 
MSP focused solely on the insurance industry: the government only 
could recover “from ‘primary plans,’ whose definition lists only entities 
which are clearly ‘within’ the insurance industry.”102 
This common understanding changed in 2003 with the amendment 
to the MSP.  The seeds of that change are discussed in the next Section. 
statute prohibited Medicare from making conditional payments except as authorized by 
subparagraph (B).  But subparagraph (B) did “not authorize any Medicare payments; it deal[t] only 
with reimbursement for certain payments.”  Id.  That is, before the MMA, Medicare was allowed to 
seek reimbursement for conditional payments, but was not technically authorized to make 
conditional payments. 
 100. See generally Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489, 496-97 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 101. 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(2)(A) (2002).  The statute also created a private right of action by 
which private citizens could seek double damages from recalcitrant primary plans.  See id. § 
1395y(b)(3)(A) (2002).  In addition, the federal government was subrogated (to the extent of any 
payment for an item or service to which subparagraph (2)(A) applies) “to any right under this 
subsection of an individual or any other entity to payment with respect to such item or service under 
a primary plan.”  Id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii). 
 102. United States v. Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund, 80 F.3d 616, 622 n.5 (1st Cir. 
1996); see also Health Ins. Ass’n of Am., Inc., 23 F.3d at 427 (Henderson, J., concurring) 
(concluding that, in light of the definition of primary plan and the legislative history, the statute was 
intended “to allow recovery only from an insurer”); United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. 
Supp. 2d 131, 146 n.22 (D.D.C. 2000) (noting that “[c]ourts have uniformly recognized that the 
statute's clear purpose was to grant the Government a right to recover Medicare costs from 
[insurers]”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 250 B.R. 298, 337 n.22 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (stating 
that “unless an alleged tortfeasor qualifies as a primary plan or received payment from a primary 
plan, the MSPA does not grant the United States the right to initiate a direct action against it”). 
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C.  The Government Wants More: The Secretary Takes on Mass Tort 
Settlements 
In the late 1990s the government found a potential new source of 
revenue for Medicare and a new avenue to expand the MSP’s reach.  In 
a series of high-stakes and high-profile mass torts, the government 
sought to recover Medicare’s expenditures from alleged tortfeasors who 
settled with injured Medicare beneficiaries and from the proceeds of any 
such settlement (i.e., from settlement funds or from any party that 
received the proceeds of the settlement).103  This was a clear departure 
from the common understanding of the MSP’s purpose: to force 
traditional insurers to provide and pay for the healthcare costs of 
individuals whom Medicare would otherwise cover.  One can assume 
that the number of Medicare beneficiaries involved in mass tort cases 
and the settlement numbers at stake drew the government to this 
strategy.104  With large settlement dollars available, and pressure on the 
government – as always – to “save” Medicare and Social Security, it was 
only natural that the government would push to recover from these 
funds.105 
 103. See, e.g., Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co., 212 F. Supp. 2d 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d 346 F.3d 
36 (2d Cir. 2003) (tobacco); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F. Supp. 2d 
1242 (N.D. Ala. 2001), rev’d sub nom United States v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 345 F.3d 866 (11th Cir. 
2003); In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F.R.D. 154 (E.D. Pa. 2001); In re Diet 
Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 99-20593, 2001 WL 283163 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2001) (Phentermine, 
Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine also known commonly as Phen Fen); Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 
2d 131; In re Dow Corning Corp., 250 B.R. 298, 307 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (silicone breast 
implants).  Before the government’s claims in Phillip Morris and Dow Corning, the “case law [was] 
devoid of any instances in which the Government attempted to sue a tortfeasor under the MSP, 
despite the fact that the statute had been in existence for twenty years.”  Orthopedic, 202 F.R.D. at 
165. 
 104. For example, in the Dow Corning bankruptcy, the United States filed proofs of claims 
seeking to “recover the costs of medical care either provided or paid for by” certain government 
agencies, including CMS, “as a result of injuries allegedly caused by breast implants.” Dow 
Corning, 250 B.R. at 307.  The government sought reimbursement for at least $32,588,197.02 in 
Medicare payments on behalf of or to 11,614 Medicare beneficiaries.  See id. at 316.  Likewise in 
1999, shortly after a number of cigarette manufacturers settled lawsuits brought by individual states, 
the United States brought suit against eleven tobacco-related entities seeking, to recover 
“conditional payments for items and services for Medicare beneficiaries whose injuries and diseases 
were caused by Defendants’ tortious and unlawful conduct.”  See Amended Complaint ¶ 169, 
United States v. Philip Morris, 99 CV 2496 (GK) (1999), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/cases/tobacco2/.  The government alleged that the tobacco defendants 
were “primazy [sic] plans from whom repayment is required for items and services paid for by the 
United States for the care and treatment of Medicare beneficiaries. . . .”  Id. ¶ 170. 
 105. Shortly thereafter, the government used this same logic for the first time in a case with an 
individual tort plaintiff.  See Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d 489 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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The crux of the government’s argument in the pre-MMA cases lay 
in the ambiguity caused by the definition of “primary plan.”  Before 
2003, the MSP defined a “primary plan” as “a group health plan,” “large 
group health plan,” or “a workman’s compensation law or plan, an 
automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including a self-insured 
plan) or no fault insurance” to the extent that one of these latter groups 
could “reasonably be expected” to make payment “promptly.”106  The 
statute did not, however, define “self-insured plan.”107  The government 
exploited this ambiguity in its suits against mass tort defendants and 
mass tort settlement funds. 
According to the government, an alleged tortfeasor who settled with 
a plaintiff was, “ipso facto a ‘self insurer’ under the MSP statute.”108  
That is, the government argued that by paying its own money to injured 
parties, an alleged tortfeasor demonstrated, as a matter of law, that the 
alleged tortfeasor was “self-insured,” because it carried its own risk of 
causing an injury instead of taking out insurance with a carrier.109  
Further, according to the government, by paying all or part of the 
settlement, an alleged tortfeasor demonstrated that it was “required or 
responsible”110 for making payments to Medicare beneficiaries.111  The 
governments’ argument also necessarily implied that it had made 
conditional payments to Medicare beneficiaries for their medical costs 
caused by the alleged tortfeasors. 
Despite the government’s plea, almost every court to rule on the 
issue before the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 rejected the 
government’s claim.112  The courts based their holdings on both a 
general theoretical objection and a close reading of the statute.  First, the 
courts reasoned that claims against insurers are different from claims 
against tortfeasors.  Although both claims create a means for society to 
 106. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 107. The implementing regulations defined a “self-insured plan” as “a plan under which an 
individual, or a private or governmental entity, carries its own risk instead of taking out insurance 
with a carrier.”  See Dow Corning, 250 B.R. at 338 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 411.50(b)(2)).  This general 
definition did not persuade courts that it was appropriate to transform a tortfeasor into a primary 
insurer. 
 108. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 497; see also Philip Morris, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 145. 
 109. See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 202 F.R.D. 154, 164 (E.D. Pa. 2001) 
(quoting United States brief).  Presumably this same argument would hold even if the alleged 
tortfeasor’s insurance carrier funded part of a settlement and the tortfeasor funded another part, 
because the tortfeasor would be self-insured to at least some part of the risk. 
 110. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2002). 
 111. See generally id.; Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 495. 
 112. See supra note 14. 
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distribute the costs of injuries to non-injured parties, the mechanisms for 
determining who should bear the costs are different under both systems.  
Insurers, unlike tortfeasors, enter into a contract to assume the risk that a 
specified contingency will occur and undertake to indemnify an insured 
or pay a certain sum if that contingency does, in fact, occur.113  
Tortfeasors, in contrast, owe compensation to injured parties because of 
some wrong committed by the tortfeasor.  In short, although both 
systems allow an injured party to share the costs of his injury, the 
distributive rights under the insurance system arise from a contractual 
relationship; the distributive rights under the tort system do not.  Thus, 
in part, these courts rejected the government’s claim, because the MSP 
did “not mention a right by the Government to recover from a tortfeasor.  
Rather, the express wording of the statute create[d] a cause of action 
against insurers and their payees.”114 
More specifically, the courts concluded the term “self-insurance,” 
although not defined in the statute, was subject to a narrow definition in 
the context of the MSP.  Under the MSP, Medicare was the secondary 
insurer “if and only if a Medicare recipient ha[d] another source of 
medical coverage under a ‘primary plan.’”115  That is, the Medicare 
reimbursement provisions were not triggered unless a Medicare recipient 
could expect a primary plan to pay for her medical expenses – whether 
from a group health plan, workmen’s compensation plan, liability 
insurance, or self-insurance plan.116  The term “plan,” in turn, indicated 
a program or a method for accomplishing a goal.117  As applied to a 
“plan” of “self-insurance,” the courts held that the term “connotes some 
type of formal arrangement by which an entity consciously undertakes to 
set aside funds to cover potential future liabilities and a formal 
procedure for processing claims made against that fund pursuant to the 
terms of the ‘plan.’”118  In other words, a “primary plan of self-
insurance” only existed where an entity had an ex ante arrangement to 
pay its own liability claims and a plan for distributing the proceeds of 
those claim 119
 113. See Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 497-98 (citing 3 LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 
39.1 (2002)). 
 114. Orthopedic, 202 F.R.D. at 165. 
 115. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 497 (emphasis in original); 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) (2002). 
 116. See Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 497. 
 117. See id. 
 118. Orthopedic, 202 F.R.D. at 166; Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 497 n.22; In re Diet Drugs Prods. 
Liab. Litig., Nos. MDL 1203, 99-20593, 2001 WL 283163, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2001). 
 119. See Goetzmann, 337 F.3d at 498.  As one leading treatise noted: 
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A defendant settling a tort claim or a series of tort claims, the courts 
reasoned, was not automatically a self-insurance plan.  The government 
could not simply show that the defendant was using its own funds to 
settle tort claims; the government had to show that the defendant had 
actually created a plan of self-insurance. 
D.  Congress Amends the Medicare Secondary Payer Act 
Congress moved swiftly to amend the MSP to reflect the 
government’s failed litigation positions.  With little debate and no 
fanfare, Congress changed the MSP as a small part of the MMA.  
Although Congress claimed that it intended to make only “technical” 
and “clarifying” amendments,120 in truth, the amendments were designed 
to legislate around the court decisions striking down the government’s 
arguments regarding the MSP’s scope.121 
although there is no precise definition of self-insurance, to meet the conceptual definition 
of self-insurance, an entity would have to engage in the same sorts of underwriting 
procedures that insurance companies employ:  estimating likely losses during the period, 
setting up a mechanism for creating sufficient reserves to meet those losses as they 
occur, and, usually, arranging for commercial insurance for losses in excess of some 
stated amount. 
1 LEE R. RUSS, COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 10:1 (1997). 
 120. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, § 301(a) (“Technical amendment concerning Secretary’s authority to make conditional 
payment when certain primary plans do not pay promptly.”); id. § 301(b) (noting that the 
amendments are “[c]larifying Amendments to conditional payment provisions”); see also 149 
CONG. REC. H12026 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2003) (“The list of primary plans for which conditional 
payment could be made would be clarified; an entity engaging in a business, trade, or profession 
would be deemed as having a self-insured plan if it carries its own risk. . . .”); 149 CONG. REC. 
S8499, S8535, (daily ed. June 25, 2003) (“The technical changes in Section 301 make clear that 
Medicare may make a conditional payment when the primary plan has not made or is not reasonably 
expected to make prompt payment.”) (letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney 
General); Id. (“The technical amendments of section 301 clarify other provisions of the MSP 
statute. . . .”). 
 121. A House Report stated that the 2003 MMA amendments were added to address “recent 
court decisions” that allowed “firms that self-insure for product liability . . . to avoid paying 
Medicare for past medical payments related to the claim.”  H.R. REP. NO. 108-178 (II), at 189-90 
(2003).  The Report stated more explicitly that: 
Recent court decisions such as Thompson v. Goetzmann resulted in a narrow 
interpretation of the statutory reference to ‘promptly.’  Liability insurers would have 
been able to draw out their settlements and avoid repaying Medicare for payment of 
medical expenses.  Moreover, firms that self-insure for product liability would have been 
able to avoid paying Medicare for past medical payments related to the claim. 
Id.  Lastly, as William Jordan, Senior counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil 
Division testified before the House Ways and Means Committee: 
Finally, I would like to restate the Department’s support for section 301 of H.R. 1, the 
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The amendments left the structure of the MSP in place and the 
additions to the text of the statute are not extensive.  Nonetheless, the 
amendments wrought significant change.  As before, the first paragraph 
of the MSP imposes certain requirements on group health plans and the 
second paragraph creates the means by which Medicare can make 
conditional payments.  Congress made no changes to the first paragraph, 
but four significant changes to the second. 
First and foremost, Congress added a definition of “self-insured 
plan” to the statute.  Post MMA, an entity has a “self-insured plan if it 
carries its own risk (whether by a failure to obtain insurance, or 
otherwise) in whole or in part.”122  The intent of this provision is clear 
from the legislative history.  It is meant to correct the courts that rejected 
the government’s litigation position by sweeping into the definition of 
self-insured plan any party that pays its own judgment or settlement.123 
Second, Congress augmented a primary plan’s duty to repay 
Medicare and adopted the government’s litigation position that the 
Secretary could recover from a primary plan even when a court had not 
determined that the primary plan was liable to pay the medical costs of a 
Medicare beneficiary by a judgment.  The MMA added the following: a 
“primary plan’s responsibility” for any conditional payment made by 
Medicare: 
may be demonstrated by a judgment, a payment conditioned upon the 
recipient’s compromise, waiver, or release (whether or not there is a 
‘Medicare Prescription Drug and Modernization Act of 2003,’ which would protect the 
integrity of the Medicare Trust Fund by clarifying that Medicare must be reimbursed 
whenever another insurer’s responsibility to pay has been established.  This section is 
consistent with the litigation positions taken by this Department and the Department of 
Health and Human Services in numerous court cases. 
Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Federal Programs: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 
108th Cong. 88 (July 17, 2003) (statement of William Jordan, Assistant Att’y Gen. for the Civil 
Division) (emphasis added). 
 122. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, § 301(b)(1) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) (2006)). 
 123. “The list of primary plans for which conditional payment could be made would be 
expanded; an entity engaging in a business, trade, or profession would be deemed as having a self-
insured plan if it carries its own risk.  Failure to obtain insurance would be required as evidence of 
carrying risk.”  H.R. REP. NO. 108-178 (II), at 189-90, (2003).  Further, as Senator Grassley noted: 
The purpose of the [MSP] is to ensure that Medicare pays first for seniors’ medical needs 
when other sources should be, in fact, paying instead of the taxpayer paying. . . .  [W]hen 
a Medicare beneficiary is injured by wrongful conduct of another entity, that entity’s 
liability insurance or the entity itself, if it has no insurance, or it might be self-insured, is 
always required to pay first instead of having the taxpayers pay. 
S15584-85, 108th Cong. (2003). 
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determination or admission of liability) of payment for items or 
services included in a claim against the primary plan or the primary 
plan’s insured, or by other means.124   
That is, post MMA, a defendant who settles a tort claim with a Medicare 
beneficiary is liable for Medicare’s conditional payments to the 
beneficiary even if the defendant explicitly denies liability for the 
Medicare beneficiaries’ injuries in the settlement document.  The 
defendant is responsible for the conditional payments, as long as the 
beneficiary “compromise[d], waive[d], or release[d]” her claims against 
the defendant as part of a settlement.  It is hard to imagine a settlement 
agreement that would not include such a waiver and release of claims. 
Third, Congress enhanced Medicare’s ability to recover from 
entities that receive payments from primary plans.  Fearing, in part, that 
Medicare would not be able to partake in the bounty of mass tort 
settlement funds, Congress added that the Secretary could “recover [on 
behalf of Medicare] . . . from the proceeds of a primary plan’s payment 
to any entity.”125  That is, after the amendment, the Secretary can take 
money from a plaintiff who receives a settlement from a tort defendant, 
an attorney who receives a portion of that settlement fund, or from the 
settlement fund itself. 
Fourth, the MMA clarified that the Secretary could, in fact, make 
payments if a “primary plan . . . has not made or cannot reasonably be 
expected to make payment” for medical treatments.126  Congress 
intended this change to fix the ambiguity created in earlier versions of 
the statute, which allowed the Secretary to recover conditional 
payments, but did not explicitly allow the Secretary to make conditional 
payments.127 
Congress hastily added these changes and barely contemplated the 
potential ramifications.  The legislative history makes clear that 
Congress’ overriding concern regarding the MMA was the radical 
 124. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, § 301(b)(2)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006)) (emphasis added). 
 125. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, § 301(b)(3) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2006)).  As stated in the House 
Report, “A primary plan, as well as an entity that receives payment from a primary plan, would be 
required to reimburse the Medicare Trust Funds for any payment made by the Secretary if the 
primary plan was obligated to make payment.” H.R. REP. NO. 108-178(II), at 189-90 (2003). 
 126. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 
108-173, § 301(a)(2)(B) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i)). 
 127. See generally Brown v. Thompson, 252 F. Supp. 2d 312, 317 n.5; see also supra note 99 
and accompanying text. 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 41 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol41/iss2/5
SWEDLOFF_FINAL 3/23/2009  2:35 PM 
2008] CAN’T SETTLE, CAN’T SUE 585 
 
 
additions to Part D, the new prescription drug benefit, not the relatively 
minor changes to the MSP.  The impact of these changes on the 
Medicare fisc was unclear.  Senator Grassley and the CBO predicted a 
savings of $9 billion over ten years.128  Presumably, however, any 
estimate was based on an assumption that Medicare beneficiaries would 
continue to bring tort lawsuits, mass torts would continue to settle, and 
parties from any tort lawsuit would continue to pay their due to 
Medicare.  There is no discussion in any of the legislative history or 
CBO reports regarding the impact that these amendments would have on 
the ability of individual or mass tort lawsuits to settle or bring lawsuits. 
So, what is the practical impact of these changes and what does this 
mean for settling parties?  First, under the MSP Congress irrefutably 
transformed settling tort defendants into primary insurers.  Any time a 
Medicare beneficiary compromises or releases his claims in exchange 
for a settlement with an alleged tortfeasor, a court must hold that the 
alleged tortfeasor has a primary plan under the MSP.  As such, the 
defendant is responsible to Medicare for Medicare’s payments to the 
beneficiary.  The regulations suggest that the government will not seek 
more than the amount of the settlement.129  That restriction, however, is 
not apparent in the text of the statute.130  At a minimum, a defendant 
may have to pay twice any settlement amount – once to a settling 
Medicare beneficiary and once to Medicare.  But the defendant could 
have to pay more.  Because Medicare may recover “double damages” 
against a primary plan that fails to recompense Medicare,131 a settling 
tort defendant may actually have to pay three times the settlement 
 128. See S15584-S15585, 108th Cong. (2003) (“These measures in [Title III of the MMA, 
titled Combatting Waste, Fraud, and Abuse] directly reduce Medicare’s spending on overpriced, 
wasteful, fraudulent items, and services to the tune of $31.3 billion over 10 years. . . .  According to 
the Congressional Budget Office, [the clarifications to the MMA] alone promise to restore Medicare 
over $9 billion out of that $31 billion.”). 
 129. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.37(d) (2006) (“If Medicare payments equal or exceed the judgment 
or settlement amount, the recovery amount is the total judgment or settlement payment minus the 
total procurement costs.”). 
 130. If the statute applied to traditional insurers, as it did as originally enacted, the maximum 
amount of the payment would be clear:  an insurance plan’s exposure would be capped at the value 
of the insurance policy.  That is, the government likely could not force an insurance company to pay 
for more than the limits of the policy at issue.  That reasoning, however, does not apply to 
defendants who have no set policy limits. 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2002) (“The United States may, in accordance with 
paragraph 3(A) collect double damages against any [primary plan].”); see also 42 C.F.R 
§ 411.24(c)(2) (2006) (“If it is necessary for CMS to take legal action to recover from the primary 
payer, CMS may recover twice the amount specified in paragraph (c)(1)(i).”). 
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amount – once to the settling beneficiary and twice the amount of 
Medicare’s expenditures to Medicare.132 
Further, post MMA, the Secretary can collect from Medicare 
beneficiaries and any other entity that receives a part of the proceeds of a 
settlement.133  In other words, the government can seek recovery from a 
settling beneficiary, the beneficiary’s counsel – if counsel received a 
contingent payment from the settlement funds – and possibly defense 
counsel.134  Although the regulations limit recovery to the amount the 
entity received from the primary insurer,135 the Secretary may be entitled 
to take the entire settlement amount, even if a plaintiff paid no out of 
pocket expenses for medical care and settled only for pain and 
suffering.136  That is, “the MSP legislation [allows] full reimbursement 
of conditional Medicare payments even though a beneficiary receives a 
discounted settlement from a third party.”137 
To put this in stark terms, consider again the case of Ms. Loftin 
from the Introduction.  Medicare paid $143,881.82 for Ms. Loftin’s 
medical care resulting from complications related to hip replacement 
surgery.  But those were not Ms. Loftin’s only damages.  It is likely that 
Ms. Loftin had legitimate claims for pain and suffering, lost wages, 
and/or other medical expenses which Medicare did not pay.  In 
compromise of those claims, the manufacturer paid Ms. Loftin 
$256,000, out of which her attorney kept a contingency fee of $102,400.  
Thus, after paying her attorney, Ms. Loftin only received $153,600 in 
settlement of her claims.138 
Had the government prosecuted its case post MMA, the Secretary 
 132. The law is not settled as to when the double damages provision is applicable.  The 
regulations suggest that the Secretary only can seek double damages when the primary plan has 
refused the government’s request for payment and necessitated litigation.  See 42 C.F.R. 
§§ 411.24(c)(1) and (c)(2) (2006).  At least one court, however, has suggested that the Secretary can 
seek double damages when the primary plan knew that Medicare paid the plaintiff’s medical 
expenses, but the defendant paid the settlement funds to the plaintiff anyway.  See Health Ins. Ass’n 
of Am., Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 417 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 133. The MSP authorizes the Secretary to recover conditional payments from any “entity that 
received payment from primary plan,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2002), or from “the proceeds 
of a primary plan’s payment to any entity,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 134. See generally United States v. Sosnowski, 822 F. Supp. 570 (W.D. Wis. 1993); Steven M. 
Kohn & Colleen T. Davies, Avoiding Traps for the Unwary: Understanding U.S. Government 
Reimbursement Rights, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 193, 200 (1999). 
 135. See 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(c) (2006). 
 136. Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Denekas v. Shalala, 943 F. Supp. 
1073 (S.D. Iowa 1996). 
 137. Zinman, 67 F.3d at 845. 
 138. See supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. 
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could have taken almost all that Ms. Loftin received in settlement of her 
claims to compensate Medicare.  That is, once the manufacturer settled 
with Ms. Loftin for any amount, the Secretary could rightly claim that 
the manufacturer had a plan of self-insurance.  As such, the Secretary 
could have recovered up to the full amount of its payments139 and Ms. 
Loftin would have been left with less than $10,000 to compensate her 
for the pain and suffering from her botched surgeries and hip 
replacement.  Thus, this full reimbursement rule “deprives poor and 
injured individuals of needed compensation for their pain and suffering, 
lost wages, and other non-medical damages.”140   
Alternatively, the Secretary could have taken Mr. Goetzmann’s 
entire fee or forced the manufacturer to pay three times the settlement 
amount – once to Ms. Loftin and twice to Medicare under the double 
damages provision.  As will be discussed below, this drives up the 
potential costs of any settlement, makes it difficult to settle tort lawsuits, 
and makes it difficult for Medicare beneficiaries to obtain legal 
representation. 
 139. See 42 C.F.R § 411.37(d) (2006); Zinman, 67 F.3d at 845. In Arkansas Department of 
Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, the Supreme Court held that States could not recover the 
full amount of their payments for medical expenses to Medicaid recipients.  547 U.S. 268 (2006).  
Rather, the Court held that a State may only recover that portion of the settlement or judgment that 
is attributable to repayment of medical services.  See id. at 285.  As summarized by Judge 
Weinstein: 
The Court first held that the assignment provisions of federal Medicaid law-requiring 
states to enact laws providing for assignment of Medicaid beneficiaries' rights to seek 
and collect payment for medical care from a responsible third party-only provide for a 
limited assignment from the recipient to the state for payment for medical items and 
services from a liable third party.  It then concluded that any state statute providing for a 
greater assignment or lien would be inconsistent with the Medicaid “anti-lien” statute, 42 
U.S.C. § 1396p, which prohibits states from placing liens against or seeking recovery of 
benefits from a Medicaid beneficiary before her death.  According to the Court, while 
the assignment provisions create an exception to the anti-lien statute for recovery of 
payments that constitute reimbursement for medical costs paid by Medicaid, any 
recovery by the state of settlement funds intended to reimburse the Medicaid beneficiary 
for pain and suffering, lost wages, or other non-medical damages would constitute an 
impermissible lien on the beneficiary's property. 
In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (citations omitted).  
That same rationale is not applicable in the Medicare context because there is no equivalent “anti-
lien” provision in the Medicare regime. 
 140. Id. 
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III. SUING AND SETTLING UNDER THE MSP: INDIVIDUAL TORT 
LAWSUITS AND MASS TORT LITIGATION 
It should be intuitively obvious that Medicare beneficiaries will 
have difficulty settling tort claims under the MSP.  What may not be as 
intuitively obvious is that the MSP’s effects could be greater than a 
simple failure to reach a negotiated settlement between individuals.  The 
MSP’s harsh liability rule could make it difficult to settle or even bring 
mass tort litigation.  Mass tort settlements sit at a tipping point, and it is 
not unreasonable to think that any additional burden on the settlement of 
mass tort cases could result in a total failure of the settlement process.  
These settlements are the lifeblood of mass tort litigation.  Without 
settlements, plaintiffs’ attorneys likely cannot bring mass tort claims. 
A.  An Economic Model of Individual Tort Settlements 
Under the neoclassical economic model of litigation, parties make 
settlement decisions by comparing their estimated economic position 
after a judgment to their estimated economic position after a 
settlement.141  In short, a party will settle a lawsuit if it expects to be 
better off after settlement than it would be after a judgment, taking into 
account the probability of a plaintiff’s victory and the costs of litigation 
and settlement. 
The neoclassical classic model makes certain assumptions about the 
parties.  First, the model assumes the parties will behave rationally; in 
the sense that the parties will attempt to maximize their expected wealth 
through the litigation process.142  Second, the model assumes that the 
parties are risk neutral; that is, that they are equally attracted to a 
settlement amount, and a fifty percent chance of receiving twice that 
amount.  Lastly, the model assumes that parties have equivalent stakes in 
 141. See generally Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 
(2000) (summarizing the classic economic model); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, 
Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH. L. REV. 107, 
111-14 (1994); Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in Securities 
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 501-02 (1991); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3-6 (1984); Richard A. Posner, An 
Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 417-
20 (1971); see also Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A 
Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (2006) (describing the real options model of 
litigation). 
 142. There are really two assumptions contained here: 1) that the parties maximize their 
expected utility and 2) that parties’ utility function of wealth is just wealth, i.e., U(W) = W. 
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the dispute.  That is, that neither side will receive a benefit other than the 
explicit terms of the settlement (e.g., the parties do not have equivalent 
stakes if one side benefits more from the precedential effect of a 
favorable verdict).143 
Under the neoclassical economic model, a plaintiff will settle a 
lawsuit when she expects to get more out of the settlement then she 
would from trying a case to a judgment, whether through a trial or 
through judgment by motion.  If the case settles, a plaintiff would not 
have to expend money on procuring the judgment; thus, the plaintiff 
subtracts the amount of the costs of procuring the judgment from the 
expected value of the litigation.  But the plaintiff will require that the 
minimum offer cover her costs of settlement.  More specifically, a 
plaintiff will settle when the defendant’s offer (O) is more than the value 
the plaintiff has placed on the claim (Vp) discounted by the probability 
that the plaintiff estimates she will win (Pp) minus the expected cost of 
procuring and collecting on the judgment (Cpj) plus the costs associated 
with negotiating and entering into a settlement (Cps).  Represented in a 
formula, the plaintiff will settle when: 
Formula (1): O > (Vp * Pp) – Cpj + Cps 
In turn, a defendant will settle any time it can settle for less than it 
would expect to lose via judgment, including the costs of litigating the 
case to that judgment or the cost of settling the case.  Thus, a defendant 
will settle when a plaintiff’s demand (D) is less than the amount the 
defendant estimates it will have to pay out post-judgment should the 
plaintiff win (Vd) multiplied by the defendant’s belief that the plaintiff 
will win (Pd) plus the costs of defense at trial (Cdj) minus out-of-court 
settlement cost (Cds).144  That is, a defendant will settle where: 
Formula (2): D < (Vd * Pd) + Cdj – Cds 
It is clear that these formulae generate the following conclusions.  
In a simple two-party dispute, a defendant will only perceive a benefit 
from paying the plaintiff an amount less that it expects the plaintiff to 
recover in a judgment, plus the costs of litigation, minus the cost of 
settlement.  Likewise, a plaintiff will perceive a benefit from any offer 
over the amount she expects to attain from judgment, minus the cost of 
attaining that judgment, plus the costs associated with settlement.  The 
 
 143. See generally Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 141, at 112-14. 
 144. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal 
Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LIT. 1067, 1075-82 (1989); see also Korobkin & 
Guthrie, supra note 141, at 111; Posner, supra note 141, at 417-20. 
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defendant’s maximum offer (Omax) is represented in formula (3) and the 
minimum amount the plaintiff will demand (Dmin) is represented in 
formula (4):145 
Formula (3): Omax = (Vd * Pd) + Cdj – Cds 
Formula (4): Dmin = (Vp * Pp) – Cpj + Cps 
As long as Omax – Dmin > 0, the parties should settle a lawsuit.146 
 A simple example will help illustrate this model.  Consider a 
lawsuit where the parties agree that the plaintiff has a 20% chance to win 
its jury demand of $500,000.  The weighted average recovery, (V * P), is 
$100,000.  Assume further that each side estimates its litigation costs at 
$35,000 and the cost of settlement at $5,000.  In this example the 
defendant may offer up to $130,000 ($100,000 + $35,000 - $5,000) to 
settle the suit, but no more.  After that, the defendant will not recognize 
any benefit.  Likewise, a plaintiff will perceive a benefit from, and thus 
should accept, any offer over $70,000 ($100,000 - $35,000 + $5,000).  
Thus, there is a window for settlement, and the parties should settle for 
some amount between $70,00 and $130,000.  Assuming equal 
bargaining power, the parties will split the difference, and settle for 
$100,000. 
Under the MSP, the window for settlement is smaller, if it exists at 
all, because of the additional liability created by settling the lawsuit.  A 
defendant will consider its cost of settling to be the transaction costs 
associated with settlement plus any potential liability to Medicare 
(which could include double damages should the defendant force the 
Secretary to seek recovery via litigation).  On the other hand, a plaintiff 
will perceive the Secretary’s claim as reducing the defendant’s offer by 
 
 145. If the parties are relatively close in their assessment of the outcome of litigation, they will 
likely reach a negotiated settlement, because it is in their economic interest to do so as litigation 
costs are generally greater than settlement costs.  See generally Cross, supra note 141, at 3-4.  That 
is, where (Vp * Pp) = (Vd * Pd), the parties will likely settle, because Cj > Cs. 
 146. Robert Cooter, Stephen Marks, and Robert Mnookin famously proposed that most 
settlements break down not because the parties do not have a settlement window, but because they 
cannot decide how to divide the surplus created by the window.  See Robert Cooter, et al., 
Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 
225 (1982).  Thus, they claim that trials occur in part because of strategic bargaining.  This 
criticism, like others of the classic model, does not change the underlying understanding of 
litigation:  to settle a lawsuit, the parties must, at a minimum, have a settlement window.  And the 
conclusions of this article are not changed by this criticism.  The MSP significantly closes the 
window for settlement. 
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the amount of potential liability.147 
Consider again the hypothetical above.  Assume the plaintiff is a 
Medicare beneficiary, and that Medicare paid $100,000 for medical care 
for the plaintiff’s claims.  Assume first that the Secretary seeks recovery 
only from the defendant.  As noted above, the defendant will consider 
the $100,000 as an additional cost of settlement.  Thus, the defendant’s 
maximum offer would be $30,000 ($100,000 + $35,000 - $105,000).  
This amount is well below the plaintiff’s minimum demand, and the case 
will not settle. 
The same result occurs if the Secretary tries to recover from the 
plaintiff.  Because the plaintiff will perceive the Secretary’s claim as 
reducing the defendant’s offer, the defendant’s offer must be greater 
than Dmin plus the total amount of Medicare liability; i.e., the defendant 
must offer more than $170,000.  This a defendant will not do.148 
In sum, economic theories of settlement suggest that the window 
for settlement is defined by the amount between the expected value of 
the suit and the expected costs of litigating suit and settling.  Because 
settling a suit creates immediate liability to Medicare, defendants will 
perceive this as an additional cost of settlement and plaintiffs will 
perceive the liability as reducing the amount that they can expect to 
receive from a settlement.  In either case, this additional – and automatic 
– liability narrows or eliminates any potential settlement window.149 
Later economic models criticize the neoclassical model arguing that 
litigants are not motivated solely by wealth maximization, that they are 
poor estimators of the probability of winning, and thus litigants make 
 147. Alternatively, the plaintiff may also perceive the Medicare liability as additional 
settlement costs as the defendants do.  Either way, the algebra is the same, and Dmin will rise as a 
result of the Medicare liability. 
 148. Even if one assumes that the plaintiff and the defendant will split the risk of liability to 
Medicare – that is, the defendants will incur $50,000 of additional costs and the plaintiff will reduce 
her settlement by $50,000 – the parties would not have a settlement window.  In this hypothetical, a 
defendant’s maximum offer will be $80,000, but the minimum a plaintiff would accept to settle is 
$120,000.  Thus, there can be no settlement. 
 149. In 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that States could not impose a lien on tort judgments or 
settlements earned on Medicaid recipients for the full value of the State’s medical expenses on 
behalf of the Medicaid beneficiary.  See Ark. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 
U.S. 268 (2006).  Although the Court based its decision on the statutory construction of the 
Medicaid anti-lien statute, it addressed the policy issues associated with imposing a full lien with 
absolute priority, stating:  “For just as there are risks in underestimating the value of readily 
calculable damages in settlement negotiations, so also is there a countervailing concern that a rule 
of absolute priority might preclude settlement in a large number of cases, and be unfair to the 
recipient in others.”  Id. at 288 (emphasis added). 
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seemingly inconsistent or irrational decisions throughout litigation.150  
However, these criticisms can be overstated and, with respect to the 
MSP liability, these criticisms will likely not change the underlying 
problems.  It is, of course, true that parties act for reasons other than 
wealth maximization.  Plaintiffs may initiate a lawsuit to bring 
wrongdoing to light, to cripple an industry, or merely to have their day 
in court.151  Presumably, however, plaintiffs’ lawyers are paid to provide 
expertise in negotiation and litigation.  These attorneys may dampen 
these emotional responses because they are less likely to bring or 
continue lawsuits simply for the psychological benefits.152  Moreover, 
where attorneys bring claims on contingency, the attorneys have an 
economic incentive to tamp down on their clients’ non-monetary desires.  
Further, the Secretary can force a defendant to pay two to three times the 
settlement amount or recover from, and thus eliminate, a plaintiff’s 
settlement or a plaintiff’s attorney’s contingency fee.  As such, the 
effects of the MSP can be quite large.  Parties’ non-economic 
motivations would have to be equally as large to counteract the effects of 
the MSP.  Likewise, even if parties are poor estimators of winning or 
otherwise fail to behave as wealth-maximizers, the parties will instantly 
recognize the automatic liability that attaches under the MSP.  As such, 
it will be more difficult for the parties to reach a settlement.  Thus, 
although the criticisms are justified, they do not change the conclusions 
of this article: under the MSP, the window for creating a benefit for both 
sides is smaller, if it exists at all.153 
 150. See generally Cross, supra note 141, at 15-19; Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 141, at 
109. 
 151. See Cross, supra note 141, at 19-20 (observing that plaintiffs, especially mass tort 
plaintiffs, may forgo their economic interest to get their “day in court,” exact “vengeance,” or to 
“impose punishment” on an industry they view as “morally blameworthy”); Deborah R. Hensler, 
Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths and Realities, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 89, 99 (“[T]he most 
frequently cited objective of lay litigants in adjudicatory proceedings was to ‘tell my side of the 
story.’”); Roy D. Simon, Jr., The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 63 (1985) 
(explaining that a plaintiff may “want to complete the process of litigation in order to feel that she 
has had her day in court,” even when a “settlement would be more favorable to the outcome at 
trial”). 
 152. See generally Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in Litigation, 12 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 31, 32 (1992); Peter H. Huang, Lawsuit Abandonment Options in Possibly 
Frivolous Litigation Games, 23 REV. LITIG. 47, 78 (2004).  
 153. Later scholars have introduced new models of litigation that consider a number of factors 
including the timing of litigation costs, the ability of the parties to learn throughout the litigation 
process, and the ability to abandon litigation.  One model that adds a significant advancement is the 
real options model.  See generally Grundfest & Huang, supra note 141, at 1272-75, 1289-92 
(defining the real options model and related literature); Huang, supra note 152, at 50-53, 56-59.  
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B.  The Structural, Ethical, and Practical Barriers To Settling Mass 
Torts 
As with individual torts, the MSP creates disincentives to settle 
mass tort litigation.  Even more than individual litigations, however, 
settlement is of the utmost importance to the parties to mass tort 
litigation and the courts that administrate them.  Parties and courts face a 
“specter of thousands, if not millions of similar trials of liability 
proceeding in thousands of courtrooms around the nation,”154 and cannot 
possibly handle the workload associated with these trials.155  But even 
While there is value in adding complexity to the classic, expected value economic model of 
litigation, it is not necessary in this article.  My conclusions are robust and not dependent on any 
particular model.  For instance, the MSP changes both the expected values for settlement and the 
options values for settlement, such that Medicare beneficiaries have no incentive to bring or settle 
tort lawsuits. 
 154. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544, 555-56, 560 (E.D. La. 1995). 
 155. Claims against pharmaceutical companies are typical of mass tort litigation today.  In any 
pharmaceutical mass tort, hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of individuals could be exposed to 
an allegedly harmful product.  See Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort 
Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 869-70 (2005).  As Stier noted: 
For example over thirty million pregnant women took Benedictin, an antinausea drug 
involved in litigation pertaining to birth defects; at least two million women used Dalkon 
Shields, an intrauterine antipregnancy device involved in litigation regarding infections 
and miscarriages; more than two million women received silicone breast implants, which 
were involved in litigation regarding autoimmune disease; and tens of millions were 
exposed in the workplace to asbestos that spawned litigation concerning lung cancer and 
mesothelioma. 
Id.  Although only fractions of those exposed generally file suit, these cases threaten to overwhelm 
the judicial system, which has no real means to try each of the cases.  For instance, by August of 
2006, two years after withdrawing Vioxx, a popular anti-arthritis drug, from the market, Merck 
faced over 14,000 federal and state lawsuits, which covered approximately 27,000 plaintiffs related 
to Vioxx.  See Alex Berenson, Legal Stance May Pay Off for Merck, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at 
C1.  Of those 27,000 claims, close to 17,000 were consolidated in front of one state court judge and 
2,900 claims were consolidated in front of one federal judge.  See Andrew Pollack, Mixed Verdicts 
for Merck in Vioxx Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at C8; Alex Berenson, A Mistrial is Declared 
in 3d Suit Over Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2005, at C1.  Similarly, in Baycol litigation, over the 
effects of an anti-cholesterol drug, Bayer and GSK faced over 13,000 lawsuits, many of which were 
consolidated for pretrial purposes in one federal court.  See Joyce Gannon, Bayer’s Latest Job Cuts 
Spare Region, THE PITTSBURGH POST GAZETTE, Dec. 3, 2004, at C1; Mark Landler, Investors 
Unfazed by Risks Associated with Bayer Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2004, at W1. 
If each of these cases were tried separately, the cases could clog a court’s docket for hundreds of 
years.  For example, if trials in a mass tort with only 2,000 plaintiffs took two weeks per plaintiff, a 
single court, working every week of the year would take over seventy years to complete the 
litigation.  This hypothetical, however, vastly overestimates the efficiency of the courts.  In the 
Vioxx litigation, for instance, each individual trial has ranged from a low of two weeks to over eight 
weeks. See Berenson, supra, at C1 (reporting on results of a two-week federal trial); Alex Berenson, 
Jury Begins to Deliberate Vioxx Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2005, at C1 (reporting that jurors began 
to deliberate after seven weeks of testimony); Susan Todd, Idaho Couple’s Second Vioxx Trial Pins 
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under the best of circumstances, parties to a mass tort who wish to settle 
face numerous barriers to settlement.  Parties face structural barriers that 
make it difficult to bring or settle claims as a class, ethical barriers that 
make it difficult to settle claims in a non-class aggregate fashion, 
practical barriers to achieving finality, and a whole host of economic and 
motivational barriers that make it difficult to reach a settlement number 
that is acceptable to all parties involved.  It is reasonable to think that 
adding the MSP into the mix could make it nearly impossible to enter 
into mass tort settlements. 
Under the current federal rules, courts generally cannot certify mass 
torts as class actions for trial or settlement.156  Most mass tort litigation 
includes individualized issues related to choice of law, causation, and 
damages.157  In light of these issues, putative class representatives in a 
mass tort likely cannot satisfy the Rule 23 requirements of typicality, 
adequacy, commonality, predominance, superiority, and notice.158  Thus, 
courts have regularly denied plaintiffs’ motions to certify mass torts as 
Merck with $47.5M Verdict, THE STAR LEDGER, Mar. 17, 2007, at 43; John Curran, Ticktock — 
Watch the Clock; Attorneys Agree to Punch In, Limit Presentation, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Feb. 25, 
2006, at Business 1 (reporting that after several Vioxx trials, Judge Carol Higbee attempted to limit 
the time it took to try a case by limiting the plaintiffs to 40 hours of trial time for their presentation 
of opening, closing, and witness examination, and limiting the defendants to 35 hours of trial time).  
And, from August 2005 to August 2006, only 8 trials reached juries nationwide.  See Alex 
Berenson, Legal Stance May Pay Off for Merck, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2006, at C1.  In light of these 
numbers, it is not hard to see how mass torts with tens or hundreds of thousands plaintiffs could 
easily overwhelm the court system.  Thus, a court must think systematically about settlement from 
the moment mass tort cases are filed. 
 156. Although state fora may be more amenable to certifying mass tort class actions, under the 
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, cases filed as national class actions in state court likely will be 
removed to a federal forum.  Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a), 119 Stat. 
9 (2005). 
 157. See generally Stier, supra note 155, at 879-84. 
 158. As Byron G. Stier noted: 
The presence of such [individualized] issues may mean that (1) the claims of class 
representatives are not typical, because class members’ claims rely on varying factual 
information or a different legal standard; (2) class representatives are not adequate 
representatives, because their claims differ factually or legally from the class members; 
(3) there may be no common issue among representatives and absent class members; (4) 
common issues may not predominate over individual issues; or (5) a class  action may 
not be superior, because the adjudication of individualized issues may make the class 
action unmanageable. 
Id. at 878.  See also Francis E. McGovern, Class Action Symposium:  The Twentieth Anniversary of 
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts: Article: A Proposed Settlement Rule for Mass Torts, 74 U.M.K.C. 
L. REV. 623, 626 (2006) (“[T]he civil procedure of mass torts has discouraged mass treatment by 
ensuring full due process for each plaintiff.  Rule 23 is less hospitable to personal injury cases.”). 
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class actions for either trial or settlement.159  The Supreme Court has 
twice considered whether mass torts can be certified for settlement 
purposes.  In both cases, the Court took a narrow view of Rule 23’s 
requirements, and all but eliminated the class as a settlement mechanism 
in products liability cases.160 
Because courts will not certify mass torts as class actions, parties 
must settle each claimant’s case individually or must settle each case as 
part of a large aggregate settlement.161  Although each individual 
plaintiff is represented in a mass tort, given the numbers of plaintiffs 
represented by the same attorneys, many individuals do not get the 
unique attention often considered concomitant with individual 
representation.162  Thus, aggregate settlements can raise basic concerns 
about conflicts of interest and fairness.163  Without a rule, like Rule 
23(e), which governs court approval for class action settlements, 
 159. See generally Stier, supra note 155, at 878-79. 
 160. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 
U.S. 815 (1999); see also McGovern, supra note 158, at 627-28.  Even if parties could certify a 
class for settlement, some defendants might be unwilling to do so given the opt-out requirements 
under Amchem and Ortiz.  In the diet drug litigation, American Home Products created a $3.75 
billion trust to handle the class claims, but tens of thousands of plaintiffs opted out of the settlement.  
See Shannon P. Duffy, Judge Approves Fen Phen Settlement, American Home Products Could Pay 
as Much as $3.75 Billion, 223 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 41 (Aug. 9, 2000).  Thus, the defendant 
bought little peace from a class action settlement. 
 161. Further, without a class mechanism, the court has no role in the settlement process.  The 
court has neither the responsibility nor rule-mandated authority to determine whether the settlement 
is procedurally and substantively fair.  Therefore, parties have been left with little guidance from 
case law regarding the proper means to settle these aggregated, but non-class, claims. 
 162. See Chamblee, supra note 17, at 172 (“In all types of aggregated actions, lawyers 
representing similar claims necessarily prepare the litigation on a group basis with little personal 
client involvement.”); Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action: Lawyer Loyalty and Client 
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 533 (2003). 
 163. Because plaintiffs’ attorneys often represent multiple mass tort claimants against the same 
defendant or defendants, these attorneys may face a conflict of interest between securing an 
aggregate settlement with the defendant for all of the claimants the attorney represents and securing 
the best possible settlement for a single client.  Plaintiffs’ counsel may have incentives to favor or 
ignore one pivotal plaintiff’s claims in the settlement over the claims of others.  See Chamblee, 
supra note 17, at 172 (“Representing catalogues or inventories of claimants often leads to conflicts 
of interest that attorneys may not be able to foresee at the beginning of litigation, such as differences 
among bargaining positions, clients’ divergent desires to settle or litigate, or the extent of latent 
injuries.”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in 
Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 386 (2000) (recognizing four distinct conflicts 
in mass tort representative litigation:  internal conflicts within a class or between subclasses, where 
members compete over allocation of a capped fund; external conflicts where some members or 
attorneys favor a settlement over litigation; conflicts that arise because different members or counsel 
have a different amount of tolerance for risk; and conflicts over control of the litigation). 
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dismissals, or compromises of claims,164 attorneys are governed only by 
the ethical rules in fashioning settlements.165  The ethical rules, however, 
create a further barrier to aggregate settlements.  Under Model Rule of 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(g),166 which has been adopted in some 
form in every jurisdiction,167 attorneys representing multiple clients 
must (a) inform each of their clients of the terms of an aggregate 
settlement; and (b) each client must consent to the settlement in 
writing.168  An attorney must follow these procedures for each of his 
clients who are covered by the settlement, even if the settlement involves 
hundreds or thousands of parties.169  The attorneys to any valid 
aggregate settlement must adhere strictly to the requirements of these 
rules or risk sanction and dissolution 170
 164. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(A) (“The court must approve any settlement, voluntary dismissal, 
or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class.”). 
 165. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2002); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR. 5-106 (1980).  See also Chamblee, supra note 17, at 170-77 (arguing that 
because multiple plaintiffs are often represented by a small number of attorneys, there are 
opportunities for collusion in the settlement process). 
 166. Rule 1.8(g) states: 
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate 
settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an aggregated 
agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed 
consent, in a writing signed by the client. The lawyer’s disclosure shall include the 
existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each 
person in the settlement. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (2002). 
 167. See Paul J. Lesti, STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS, Appendix Y.1, fn. 8 (2d ed. 1993); ALI 
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 3.15, (Discussion Draft 2006). 
 168. See, e.g., Tax Auth., Inc. v. LeMaire-McCumsey Group, Inc., 898 A.2d 512 (N.J. 2006). 
 169. See, e.g., State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Watson, 897 P.2d 246 (1994) (rejecting lawyer’s 
argument that he was required to consult only with his “true client,” the representative of the 
decedent’s estate); Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. 1986) (holding that 
an aggregate settlement void and unenforceable when plaintiffs’ attorney consented to settlement on 
behalf of 349 clients without informing each client of the existence and value of the other claims 
before obtaining consent). 
 170. There are several potential consequences to the parties, their counsel, and the settlement if 
counsel fails to meet the requirements of Rule 1.8(g).  First, a plaintiff’s attorney who fails to 
comply with the rule may face forfeiture of his fees, see, e.g., Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229 
(Tex. 1998), or disciplinary penalties for failing to obtain his clients’ informed consent, see In re 
Hoffmann, 883 So.2d 425, 435 (La. 2004) (attorney suspended for three months for failure to obtain 
clients’ informed consent); In re Jaeger, 213 B.R. 578 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (disqualifying 
attorneys from representing all defendants in the proceeding).  Likewise, defendant’s counsel may 
run afoul of ethical rules for encouraging a settlement that violates Rule 1.8(g) by assisting or 
inducing another lawyer to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.  See James M. McCormack, 
Ethical Pitfalls in Representing Multiple Parties: How to Get Through the Case Without Tripping, 
19th Annual Asbestos Litigation Conference, 2004 WL 1718493 (April 29-30, 2004).  Second, the 
settlement may not be binding upon a plaintiff who claims he never consented to the terms.  This 
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However, it is neither simple nor efficient to gather all of the 
necessary approvals during the settlement process.  Given the number 
and diversity of plaintiffs in mass tort litigation, the unanimity 
requirement may create further expense and delay in a settlement, 
impose on the privacy of settling parties, and encourage individual 
plaintiffs to withhold their consent until they receive disproportionately 
large settlement allotments.171  It may also preclude some aggregate 
settlements altogether if unanimous consent is impossible, especially if 
plaintiff “holdouts” undermine collective action.172 
In addition to the structural and ethical barriers, the parties to a 
mass tort can struggle to achieve finality.  In any tort, the parties must 
try to resolve a number of claims in addition to the claims of the injured 
party.  For example, defendants will want to resolve claims derivative to 
the injured party, such as survivor claims, wrongful death claims, and 
spousal and dependent claims, at the same time they settle with the 
plaintiff.  Settling defendants will also want to resolve any potential 
claims by or against non-settling defendants for contribution and 
indemnity.  If defendants settle only with the plaintiffs, they can gain no 
true peace through settlement.  In any tort case, parties may struggle to 
identify each of the potential claimants and get releases for all current 
and future claims.  In a mass tort, this process can be a logistical morass.  
For instance, the parties must determine who can bring and potentially 
release wrongful death claims, who has a right to bring a loss of 
consortium or society claim, and which non-settling defendants might 
have other potential future claims.  The answers to these questions are 
often jurisdiction dependent.  With thousands of potential plaintiffs, 
simply gathering the appropriate releases can be costly and labor 
intensive.173 
Moreover, defendants in mass torts are repeat players in the 
litigation.  Defendants must be concerned about the outcome of each of 
the individual cases in a mass tort, both in terms of actual precedent and 
not only affects plaintiffs’ counsel, but also undermines the defendant’s goal of achieving finality 
and an aggregate resolution of claims against them.  Third, a court may reject the entire settlement 
as void for violating Rule 1.8(g).  See, e.g., Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 708 S.W.2d 225, 
229 (Tex. 1986). 
 171. See Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Mass Lawsuits and the Aggregate Settlement Rule, 
32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 733, 736 (1997). 
 172. See id. 
 173. See Richard L. Berkman & Rick Swedloff, Settlement Issues in Mass Torts, in MASS 
TORTS (Sean Wajert & Andrew Gaddes eds., Law Journal Press) (forthcoming 2009). 
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creating a norm for settlement.174  As such, resolving each individual 
lawsuit may have value beyond the intrinsic value of one person’s claim.  
There is pressure on defendants to litigate each case for the value of the 
precedent and to signal to the plaintiffs that the defendant will not settle 
cheaply.  There may also be pressure on plaintiffs’ attorneys in early 
suits to signal a willingness to fight.175  Early victories in court may set a 
high standard for settling later cases.  Thus, the parties may skew the 
value of each individual case such that settlement becomes more 
difficult. 
Each of these problems exists in any mass tort case.  The structural 
and ethical problems drive up the transaction costs related to settlement, 
and thus make settlement a less attractive alternative to litigation.176  As 
is clear from formulae (3) and (4) above, when the cost of settlement 
grows, a defendant’s maximum offer will shrink and the minimum 
amount a plaintiff will accept to settle the suit will grow.  The valuation 
problems also make it less likely that the parties can find a common 
ground for settlement.  Thus, these barriers to settlement make it more 
difficult to settle a lawsuit. 
As in an individual tort, the MSP adds an additional difficulty for 
parties trying to settle mass tort litigation: automatic liability for 
Medicare’s costs.  As such, a Medicare beneficiary settling a tort claim 
could find herself without any compensation after Medicare has taken its 
due.  Likewise, a defendant could find itself liable to Medicare for 
double the amount of settlement or more without ever admitting liability 
for the underlying tort.  It is reasonable to think that the additional 
liability the MSP creates makes it more difficult, if not impossible, for 
Medicare beneficiaries to settle claims in the mass tort setting.  Indeed, 
Judge Weinstein made this same observation stating: “Settlement of 
mass tort litigations for personal injuries have [sic] become 
extraordinarily complex and difficult as a result of the attempts by the 
United States to collect on Medicare liens and of the states to enforce 
their Medicaid liens.”177 
 174. See generally Cross, supra note 141, at 7- 15. 
 175. Although ostensibly individual plaintiffs drive the litigation in a non-class setting, because 
plaintiffs’ attorneys represent multiple clients, they are often driving much of the litigation strategy 
in mass torts.  See infra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury 
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 1031 (1993) (“Transaction costs – 
chiefly, legal fees – dwarf the amounts paid to injured claimants, who often wait years to receive 
compensation.”). 
 177. In re Zyprexa Prods Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 461 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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Given the number of Medicare beneficiaries in recent mass tort 
litigation, it is not hard to imagine that these beneficiaries likely make up 
a significant percentage of the plaintiffs in many mass tort cases.178  In 
aggregate settlements – even those in which each individual plaintiff is 
theoretically acting autonomously or in each of the individual 
settlements that make up a global settlement of a mass tort – the total 
settlement dollars at stake matter.  Defendants certainly track their total 
exposure, plaintiffs want to know their total recovery, and plaintiffs’ 
attorneys must be concerned with their total fees.  If the Secretary can 
automatically increase a defendant’s exposure, take a share of the 
settlement, or collect from a contingency fee, the total settlement 
numbers change and the window for settlement shrinks.  Additionally, 
settlement becomes less likely if it is possible at all. 
C.  Can’t Settle, Can’t Sue 
If it is more difficult for Medicare beneficiaries to settle tort claims, 
three outcomes are possible.  (1) Medicare beneficiaries will have no 
difficulty finding representation and continue to bring tort claims to trial; 
(2) Plaintiffs’ attorneys will refuse to represent Medicare beneficiaries in 
individual or mass tort lawsuits; or (3) Plaintiffs’ attorneys will not bring 
claims as a mass tort.  The first of these outcomes is unlikely and the last 
two lead to an inefficiency in the tort system. 
As with the decision about whether to settle a lawsuit, a plaintiff 
makes her decision about whether to bring a legal claim based upon her 
subjective valuations of the claim and the expense of succeeding on the 
claim.  Where a plaintiff expects to receive a greater benefit from a 
favorable court judgment or settlement than the cost of achieving that 
judgment or settlement, she will bring the claim.179  In a dispute where a 
plaintiff pays for her attorneys’ fees on a fee-for-service basis, the 
plaintiff alone is the decision maker.  She will bring suit if she 
anticipates a benefit.  If she does not anticipate a benefit from bringing 
suit, she will not do so.  In personal injury torts, however, plaintiffs are 
typically represented on a contingent fee basis.  The only costs that 
 178. See, e.g., supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 179. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 144, at 1082 (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical 
Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 
(1982)).  As discussed above, the benefits included in the plaintiff’s calculations can be non-
monetary benefits, including a desire to have her day in court or a desire to punish an industry 
perceived of wrongdoing. 
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accrue to the plaintiff, if any, are court costs, time, and opportunity cost.  
Thus, the decision about whether to litigate a case rests in large part with 
an attorney.  As with a plaintiff, a contingency fee attorney will bring a 
claim when she believes that it would be profitable to do so, and will not 
bring a claim when it is not. 
The MSP discourages Medicare beneficiaries and their contingency 
fee attorneys from bringing suit in simple tort disputes for two reasons.  
First, the MSP increases the costs of resolving the dispute by forcing tort 
lawsuits to trial instead of settlements.180  Second, the MSP reduces the 
total recovery beneficiaries and their contingency fee attorneys expect.  
The imposition of Medicare liability means that to consider bringing a 
lawsuit, plaintiffs must expect to recover significantly more than the 
amount Medicare expended for the plaintiff’s medical care.  Represented 
in a formula, if M represents the costs Medicare expended on behalf of a 
plaintiff, a plaintiff would only bring suit when: 
Formula (5): (Vp * Pp) – Cpj > M181 
Under the MSP, Vp is lower because the Secretary may take a 
portion of any recovery and Cpj is higher because the MSP forces trials 
rather than settlements. 
Similarly, the MSP dissuades attorneys from taking a Medicare 
beneficiary’s tort claims on a contingent basis.  Because a contingency 
fee attorney is compensated based on the size of the plaintiffs’ recovery 
minus the costs of procuring that recovery, a lower Vp182 and a higher 
Cpj will make a potential case less attractive.  Under the MSP, 
 
 180. See Cooter & Rubinfeld, supra note 144, at 1083 (“[L]aws that increase the costs of 
resolving disputes are likely to decrease the frequency with which legal claims are asserted and 
increase the cost of settling those that are asserted.”).  As noted by Judge Weinstein: 
[b]ecause it may deprive them of any compensation for their injuries, the full 
reimbursement approach gives many beneficiaries little incentive to pursue valid claims 
or, if they do, to accept otherwise reasonable settlement offers, thereby tending to push 
them into uncertain litigation that burdens the courts and may result in little or no 
recovery for either the beneficiaries or for Medicare or Medicaid. 
Zyprexa, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 470. 
 181. Assuming that beneficiaries have standing to bring a claim for medical expenses 
expended by Medicare on their behalf, Vp includes M as part of its value, in which case, it is more 
likely that the value of plaintiff’s claim will exceed the value of M.  This assumption is represented 
in formula (5).  If, on the other hand, beneficiaries cannot bring claims on behalf of Medicare, a 
plaintiff will only bring a claim where her damages (including pain and suffering and medical 
expenses not covered by Medicare) exceed (M + Cpj)/Pp. 
 182. Even if a contingency fee attorney is compensated based on the settlement amount rather 
than the amount paid to the beneficiary after the Secretary takes Medicare’s share, the MSP could 
reduce Vp.  If there is a window for settlement after the MSP is accounted for, the surplus will be 
lower.  Thus, the settlement amount is likely to be smaller as well. 
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e is 
little
the number of potential claims and the greater the likelihood that the 
 
contingency fee attorneys will have to bring claims to trial and thus 
invest more time into a given representation.  Lastly, the MSP may 
dissuade contingency fee representation because the Secretary can 
recover Medicare conditional payments from any “entity that [] 
receive[s] payment from a primary plan.”183  To the extent that an 
attorney accepts a contingency fee from a settling tortfeasor (now a 
primary plan under the MSP), the Secretary may claim a right to recover 
from the attorneys.  If attorneys cannot recover their contingency fees 
from Medicare beneficiaries even if they win or settle a case, ther
 incentive to represent them. 
Mass torts are like other personal injury claims.  Plaintiffs’ 
attorneys in a mass tort generally work on a contingency fee basis and, 
thus, the decision about whether to bring individual claims is made by an 
attorney.  But mass torts raise further complex questions about the 
incentives for bringing suit, because some law firms represent hundreds 
or thousands of individual plaintiffs and represent plaintiffs with serious 
claims, minor injuries, and latent claims.184  The attorneys know from 
the minute they begin recruiting plaintiffs that some of their claims will 
be profitable, even if they go to trial, while other claims have value only 
if plaintiffs’ attorneys can negotiate an aggregate settlement.  Thus, an 
attorney may not care whether a single case is profitable when 
determining whether to bring mass tort claims.  Rather, plaintiffs’ 
attorneys base their estimates about the expected value of mass tort 
litigation on the number of claims brought, the commonality among 
those claims, and the interdependence of the case values.185  “The larger 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) (2006). 
 184. The motivation for this aggregation is simple:  a large roster of clients provides economies 
of scale in the litigation and translates into more power when it becomes time to select a steering 
committee and a greater piece of a settlement pie once the settlement range is set.  Although there is 
a promise of individual representation, when individual firms represent a large number of individual 
claimants in the same litigation, it is clear these firms, not individual plaintiffs, drive litigation 
decisions. 
 185. See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 176, at 1033.  In an early work describing the nature 
of mass torts, Hensler and Peterson noted that three factors distinguish mass torts from other high 
volume personal injury litigation, such as automobile accidents: “the large number of claims 
associated with [the litigation]; the commonality of the issues and actors within a litigation; and the 
interdependence of the claim values.”  Id. at 965.  The authors explain that because of the 
commonality of facts and players, the “likely amount that one plaintiff will receive for a claim 
depends upon the values of  other claims.”  Id. at 967.  Thus, the expected value of any claims may 
rise or fall with plaintiff awards, defense verdicts, or evidentiary rulings in other cases within the 
litigation.  See id. 
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common factors among claims will pull the values of many claims 
upward, the larger the expected value of the litigation.”186 
Mass torts tend to follow a predictable litigation pattern.  At the 
beginning, plaintiffs’ attorneys identify a potential mass claim.  They 
then recruit clients who have suffered the injury and file complaints.  
After, or while, seeking discovery, the parties try a small group of cases 
to determine whether the claims at issue are viable – that is, whether the 
plaintiffs can establish causation and liability – and the range of 
damages.187  If, in fact, the claims are viable, the parties use the trials as 
data points to set the settlement range and ultimately enter a global 
settlement.188 
So long as the mass tort litigation follows this predictable course, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys expect that early cash outlays toward enrolling a 
large roster of clients, seeking complex and extensive discovery, and 
bringing individual trials will yield great profits at the time of aggregate 
settlements.189  That is, the truly profitable aspect of mass torts is settling 
a large number of claims where the attorney has invested little to no time 
or money, regardless of the level of injury sustained by the plaintiff. 
The MSP, however, could disrupt the expected progression toward 
an aggregate settlement.  At least with respect to some portion of 
represented plaintiffs – Medicare beneficiaries – the MSP makes it more 
difficult to settle mass tort claims.  As such, plaintiffs’ attorneys may 
decline to represent Medicare beneficiaries in mass tort actions.  
Alternatively, to the extent that Medicare beneficiaries make up a large 
percentage of the potential claimants, plaintiffs’ attorneys may decline to 
 186. Id. 
 187. See Francis E. McGovern, Settlement of Mass Torts in a Federal System, WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 871, 872 (2001); Hensler & Peterson, supra note 176, at 1034.  In picking these early trials, 
plaintiffs’ attorneys push the most meritorious and sympathetic claimants and defendants often push 
the weaker claims.  The strategic bargaining over these early cases can impact the ultimate 
settlement numbers. 
 188. See McGovern, supra note 187, at 872. 
 189. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate 
Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571, 1602 (2004).  
Given the precedent-setting effect of early lawsuits, defendants are willing to expend great amounts 
to defend these early trials.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys must be willing to match those outlays.  They can 
only do so when they represent enough clients that they have an incentive to match the outlays of 
the defense attorneys.  If plaintiffs’ attorneys do not aggregate all of the potential claims against a 
defendant, they will not enjoy the same economies of scale that the defendant enjoys, and may not 
invest properly in the prosecution of the claims.  That is, the defendants will have a greater incentive 
to expend money to defend the claims than the plaintiffs have to expend money to prosecute the 
claims.  See generally David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only Option for 
Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 847 (2002). 
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bring claims in aggregate or mass tort form altogether.  That is, if 
plaintiffs’ attorneys determine that they cannot obtain a significant 
aggregate settlement because the Medicare beneficiaries make up a large 
percentage of the potential claimants or because Medicare beneficiaries 
otherwise make it more difficult to settle the claims, the attorneys may 
choose to abandon the mass tort form.  In doing so, the attorneys may 
expect that they can bring individual claims without the defendants 
gearing up to defend hundreds or thousands of similar claims. 
Thus, the MSP could discourage worthy claimants from bringing 
suit and discourage attorneys from bringing mass torts altogether. 
IV. AN INEFFICIENT LIFE WITHOUT MASS TORTS 
At a minimum, because of the MSP, Medicare beneficiaries will be 
underrepresented in torts generally and mass torts specifically.  Let’s call 
this the “weak theory.”  But the MSP could yield a greater problem.  
Because Medicare beneficiaries can make up a significant percentage of 
claimants in a mass tort, plaintiffs’ attorneys may determine that it is 
inefficient to invest the time and energy to bring mass aggregate claims.  
Rather, they will cherry pick the plaintiffs who have the greatest 
probability of victory (those plaintiffs that are the most sympathetic, the 
most injured, or some combination of both) and bring these as individual 
claims.  Let’s call this the “strong theory.”  Both the weak and the strong 
theory lead to inefficient outcomes for achieving corrective justice and 
deterrence.  Moreover, under both theories the government likely 
suffers. 
First, and quite simply, from a corrective justice standpoint, if 
Medicare beneficiaries go unrepresented in any of the forms discussed 
above, significant numbers of plaintiffs will not find redress for some 
portion of the damages they suffer – pain and suffering, lost wages, and 
uncovered medical bills.190  Under the strong theory – that plaintiffs’ 
attorneys cannot afford or will otherwise refuse to bring mass tort 
actions because the MSP disrupts the financial life cycle of a mass tort – 
many claims will never be brought.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys may be willing 
to chase large damage awards for those plaintiffs who have particularly 
high damages and/or who will be particularly sympathetic to a jury.  
Plaintiffs’ attorneys will be unwilling to do so for all other plaintiffs, 
 190. Presumably Medicare has already covered some portion of the beneficiary’s medical bills.  
If the beneficiary chooses not to bring suit, the Secretary will not seek recovery from the 
beneficiary. 
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including potential claimants who are not Medicare beneficiaries, 
because it would be inefficient to bring mass tort actions. 
Even under the weak theory – that lawyers will not represent 
Medicare beneficiaries in individual or mass tort litigation – some claims 
will not find redress, because the claims of Medicare beneficiaries will 
not be brought.  Even if the Secretary brings direct or subrogation claims 
against the tortfeasors to recover Medicare’s costs, the beneficiaries’ 
other costs will not be compensated. 
Second, from a deterrence standpoint, if tortfeasors are not made to 
redress the harms they cause, they will not invest the proper amount in 
preventing harm.191  Optimal deterrence occurs when firms are made to 
internalize all of the negative externalities that their harmful conduct 
creates.  When threatened with liability for all of the harms caused, firms 
will invest efficiently to prevent these harms.  That is, each firm will 
invest “up to the point at which the expense of taking an additional unit 
of precaution exceeds the benefit of the additional risk avoided.”192  
When firms invest up to that point, the firms will avoid unreasonable 
risk, and both society in the abstract and each individual therein will 
recognize an increase in welfare.193  If defendants do not internalize all 
of the harms, they will not invest optimally. 
Under both the strong and the weak theory, attorneys will not bring 
claims on behalf of all potential plaintiffs.  Thus, even if the defendants 
are forced to pay for all of the harms caused to some set of plaintiffs, 
other plaintiffs will not find representation and defendants will not pay 
for (and not internalize) the full extent of the injuries caused.   
 191. Whether one supports corrective justice or a deterrence rationale for tort, and whether one 
focuses on procedural fairness for each individual claimant or on efficiency in the overall process, 
the goal of any tort regime should be, in part, to reduce the rate of negligent conduct.  See generally 
Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1827-28 (1997) (reconciling deterrence and corrective justice theories by 
arguing, in part, that both schools of thought are generally interested in reducing negligent conduct). 
 192. Rosenberg, supra note 189, at 843-44. 
 193. See id. (arguing that ex ante individuals prefer firms to invest in the proper amount of 
precaution; thus, when firms invest efficiently, the welfare of society and the individual increases). 
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Even those claims that are brought may reap smaller rewards either 
in litigation or settlement, because plaintiffs’ attorneys may under-invest 
in developing their clients’ claims.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys will invest “in 
developing [their clients’] side of a claim to the extent that [their] net 
return on investment is maximized.”194  When plaintiffs’ attorneys, 
acting in concert, represent fewer than all who are harmed, their 
expected return will be lower, and it is unlikely that they will invest the 
optimal amount in their claim.  As such, they may not achieve the 
maximum damage award for those claims that they choose to bring.  
This, of course, will not create the proper incentives for optimal 
deterrence.195 
Third, under the MSP, the Secretary may have a more difficult time 
recovering from tortfeasors on behalf of Medicare.  First party liability 
litigation can be (and has been) a free source of information about 
potential suits that the government could bring against alleged 
tortfeasors as a subrogee.  Under the strong theory, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
may not invest properly in the litigation, which could, for instance, result 
in a narrower discovery campaign or a more limited scope of litigation 
strategies.  Thus, the Secretary may be deprived of valuable information 
that plaintiffs could have obtained through discovery and the Secretary 
will not get a preview of the defendants’ responses to a more fulsome set 
of plaintiffs’ theories. 
V. BALANCING THE EQUATION 
I am not suggesting that Medicare should have no recourse against 
tortfeasors.  To the extent that Medicare covers medical costs that result 
from a tortious act, the Secretary must have a claim against tortfeasors 
for the harms that the tortfeasors cause Medicare beneficiaries.  
Otherwise, the tortfeasor would reap a windfall, would not internalize all 
 194. Id. at 848.  Rosenberg argues that the only way that mass tort plaintiffs’ attorneys will 
have the proper incentives to optimally invest in trial preparation is to create mandatory class 
actions for mass torts.  However, many plaintiffs’ attorneys unofficially aggregate claims together 
and share the costs of litigation by pooling their resources.  See generally Stier, supra note 155 
(arguing that plaintiffs’ attorneys can, and do, work in litigation networks to achieve efficiencies of 
scale).  Although this may increase transaction costs, it is not clear that those additional transaction 
costs are significantly greater than the transaction costs incurred when a defendant is represented by 
national counsel or multiple law firms, as is quite common today. 
 195. Although mass tort litigation soaks up scarce judicial resources, Congress likely did not 
enact the MSP as a means to curb mass tort litigation.  And it should not be used as such.  
Accidental tort reform – especially when based on a provision designed to increase the Secretary’s 
power to refill his own coffers – is not the answer to problems created by mass torts 
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of its negative externalities, and would not invest in the proper amount 
of precaution.  The cause of action, however, should not strip an alleged 
tortfeasor of its rightful defenses as the MSP does.  The MSP creates a 
disincentive to settle because a defendant is automatically liable if it 
settles – that is, it has no defense to the Secretary’s claim for 
reimbursement post MMA. 
Even if Medicare differs in some respects from private health 
insurance, it is a quintessential insurance program.  Like a private 
insurer that distributes the risk of individual harm across a portfolio of 
insureds, the government insures Medicare beneficiaries from the cost of 
illness and disability, and distributes the costs of the individual financial 
risks across all workers.196  When an insurer pays benefits to an insured 
that a third party should have paid, the insurer generally has rights to 
recover against the third party.  Those rights may be direct or derivative 
depending on the nature of the third party.  If the third party is a primary 
insurer, the secondary or excess insurer has a direct cause of action 
against the primary insurer for indemnification.  If the third party is a 
tortfeasor, the insurer has a derivative cause of action through the 
insured – a right of subrogation.197  The direct and derivative rights are 
very different actions. 
The direct cause of action is based on the insurer’s contractual 
rights and responsibilities vis-à-vis the insured and other insurers.  The 
extent of a primary insurer’s liability should be clear from the face of the 
insurance contracts.  Likewise, the primary insurer’s defenses sound in 
contract.  For instance, a primary insurer could argue that it is not liable 
to Medicare because the insurance policy was not in force at the time of 
the harm, that the scope of the contract did not cover the insured’s 
harms, or that another insurer should be the primary insurer.  Each of 
these defenses will be based on the contract and the common law of 
insurance contract interpretation. 
In contrast, when an insurer has paid its insured for injuries caused 
by a third party’s tortious act, the insurer can step into the shoes of the 
 196. Of course, Medicare is forced to cover everyone who is Medicare eligible – e.g., 
individuals who are sixty-five or older and have worked, or be a spouse of one who worked, for ten 
years in a Medicare eligible job, those with end stage renal disease or are otherwise disabled – while 
private insurers can exclude certain risks.  Therefore, it is not an exact analogy and there may be a 
reason to treat Medicare differently in some circumstances.  Nonetheless, the MSP strategy is self-
defeating, as discussed above. 
 197. See generally Hanoch Dagan & James J. White, Governments, Citizens, and Injurious 
Injuries, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 384-85, 399 (2000) (defining subrogation). 
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insured and sue the tortfeasor for its harmful acts.  Because the insurer 
merely stands in the shoes of its insured, the insurer’s rights are no 
greater than those of the insured and the tortfeasor retains all of its tort 
defenses.198  For instance, the tortfeasor could argue that her actions 
were not negligent or that the tortfeasor did not cause the insured’s 
harms. 
Unfortunately, post MMA, the MSP conflates these two actions.  
Congress originally enacted the MSP as a means of defraying Medicare 
costs by forcing other insurers to act as a primary insurer.  As discussed 
above, post MMA, the MSP transforms settling tortfeasors into primary 
insurers and transforms what should be an action sounding in tort into an 
action sounding in contract.  In this, the statute strips the settling 
tortfeasor of its potential tort defenses.  Defendants settling tort claims 
with Medicare beneficiaries lose any tort defenses they may have had 
against Medicare, and could be liable to Medicare for the settlement 
amount, the amount of Medicare’s expenditures, or more. 
The solution to this problem is simple: revert to the understanding 
of the MSP before the MMA.  Give the government a direct indemnity 
claim against insurers.  Give the government a derivative claim – a claim 
of subrogation – against tortfeasors.  The statute contemplates both of 
these causes of action. 
The natural reading of the MSP is to give the Secretary a direct 
cause of action against primary insurers.199  In other words, the 
Secretary should retain its right to bring direct claims against insurers or 
those companies with defined and distinct ex ante self-insurance plans 
when those plans fail to cover Medicare beneficiaries.  If, as before the 
MMA, the government is limited to claims against “entities which are 
clearly ‘within’ the insurance industry,”200 the direct cause of action will 
make sense internally and will not impact tort settlements.  This will 
help define the limit and scope of the Secretary’s claims against the 
primary insurer.  For instance, the primary insurer’s policy limit would 
determine the maximum amount the Secretary could re 201
The statute also grants the Secretary the right to be subrogated to 
 198. As Dagan and White explain, a subrogee’s rights are “derivative of those of the direct 
victims, due to and to the extent of the unsolicited benefits conferred.  As such, the subrogee’s 
rights can be no greater than the rights of the subrogor.”  Id. at 398. 
 199. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2002). 
 200. United States v. R.I. Insurers' Insolvency Fund, 80 F.3d 616, 622 n.5 (1st Cir. 1996); see 
also supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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the beneficiaries’ claims.  The statute states: “The United States shall be 
subrogated (to the extent of payment made under this subchapter for 
such an item or service) to any right under this subsection of an 
individual or any other entity to payment with respect to such item or 
service under a primary plan.”202  Thus, the Secretary can step into the 
shoes of the beneficiary and assert a tort claim against a third party to the 
extent of Medicare’s expenditures. 
Reverting to this understanding and giving the Secretary both the 
direct and derivative rights of other insurers corrects the problems 
created by the MMA.  The Secretary can still force other insurers to live 
up to their primary obligations via a direct cause of action.  Further, the 
Secretary can force tortfeasors to internalize all of the negative 
externalities their actions create by threatening the tortfeasors with full 
liability.  Yet, alleged tortfeasors can settle lawsuits with Medicare 
beneficiaries without fear of additional, automatic liability because they 
retain their tort defenses.  Likewise, plaintiffs’ attorneys can continue to 
represent Medicare beneficiaries and bring mass tort claims.  As a result, 
the Secretary can gain valuable information about potential third party 
tortfeasors for future suits or intervene in suits brought by beneficiaries.  
In short, reverting to the pre-MMA understanding of the MSP would 
balance the equation and restore the natural balance of the tort system. 
 202. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iv) (2006). 
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